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*Chapter 6*

**DESTINATION NETHERLANDS: HISTORY  
OF IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION  
POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS**

*Masja van Meeteren,<sup>1\*</sup> Sanne van de Pol,<sup>2</sup>  
Rianne Dekker,<sup>1</sup> Godfried Engbersen<sup>1</sup> and Erik Snel<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup>Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of  
Sociology, Rotterdam, Netherlands

<sup>2</sup>University of Antwerp, Policy Research Centre on  
Civic Integration, Antwerpen, Belgium

**ABSTRACT**

This chapter is about immigration and immigrant groups in the Netherlands. In the first section, we provide a short introduction to the history of immigration to the Netherlands. Against this background, we discuss the major policy developments of the last decades in seven policy domains of immigration: asylum migration, labour migration (including highly skilled), family migration, illegal migration, return migration, integration, and citizenship in the second section. Having discussed these policies, structuring immigration and integration, we zoom in on six strategically selected countries from which people have migrated to the Netherlands: Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, India, Morocco and Ukraine. These six migrant groups mirror the increasing diversity of migration to the Netherlands. They come from different continents (Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia), vary in size, and represent different stages of migration to Dutch society. Migration from Morocco expanded decades ago and as a result, Moroccans in the Netherlands currently form a large immigrant community. At present however, the migration flow is declining. Migration from Brazil on the other hand is still growing rapidly. Migration flows from Ukraine and Bangladesh are much smaller in size and they have more recently begun to get started. In addition, while Ukrainian migration flows have the potential to increase, flows from Bangladesh are more likely to stagnate. Egyptians form a middle-sized, divided (along religious lines) community in the

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\* Corresponding author: Masja van Meeteren. E-mail: vanmeeteren@fsw.eur.nl.

Netherlands that has been established for years, with little further growth. Migration flows from India are diverse, consisting of a recently started and expanding flow of highly-skilled workers and an established group of Surinamese with roots in India. For each country, we delve into the immigration history by showing different types of data stemming from statistical sources as well as in-depth interviews with experts. Analyzing the migration histories of immigrant groups that are in very different stages of migration, it is demonstrated that distinct migration flows are generated differently. Moreover, the selected cases illustrate that there are substantial differences between migrants from specific countries in terms of generation, migration motives, religious background and education. It therefore also indicates that it is crucial not to consider migrants from the same country of origin a homogeneous group, but to take this heterogeneity within migration groups into account when doing research or developing policies on immigration and integration.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter<sup>1</sup> provides an overview of the history of immigration and immigration policies in the Netherlands. In the next section, we show that the Netherlands has long been a country of emigration, only to become a country of immigration in the 1960s, when many labour migrants from the Mediterranean area arrived. This wave of guest workers was followed by migrants who came for purposes of family reunification, migrants from Surinam who came after the former colony's independence, asylum seekers in the 1990s, and, more recently, migrants from new European member states as well as highly skilled migrants.

Against this background, in the third section, called 'Shifting paradigms in Dutch immigration and integration policies,' we discuss the major policy developments of the last decades in seven policy domains of immigration: asylum migration, labour migration (including highly skilled), family migration, illegal migration, return migration, integration, and citizenship. It shows that the Netherlands has been a reluctant country of immigration for decades (Cornelius et al. 1994). Although the Netherlands had a positive migration surplus since the early 1960s, successive governments denied officially that the Netherlands was a country of immigration. It was not until 1998 that the Dutch government officially acknowledged that the Netherlands had become an immigration country. Migration and integration policies in the Netherlands have changed severely over the past forty years. Particularly after the 2002 elections, which were marked by the rise and death of Pim Fortuyn, integration policies focused more on assimilation and immigration policies became more selective (Entzinger 2002).

Having discussed these policies of immigration and integration, we zoom in on six strategically selected countries from which people have migrated to the Netherlands: Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, India, Morocco and Ukraine. These six migrant groups mirror the increasing diversity of migration to the Netherlands. They come from different continents (Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia), vary in size, and represent different stages of migration to Dutch society. Migration from Morocco expanded decades ago and as a result, Moroccans in the Netherlands currently form a large immigrant community. At present however, the Moroccan migration flow is declining. Migration from Brazil on the other hand

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is still growing rapidly. Migration flows from Ukraine and Bangladesh are much smaller and they have more recently begun to get started.

In addition, while Ukrainian migration flows have the potential to increase, flows from Bangladesh are more likely to stagnate. Egyptians form a middle-sized, divided (along religious lines) community in the Netherlands that has been established for years, with little further growth. Migration flows from India are diverse, consisting of a recently started and expanding flow of highly-skilled workers and an established group of Surinamese who have roots in India. For each country, we delve into the immigration history by showing different types of data stemming from statistical sources as well as in-depth interviews with experts.

Through the analysis of the migration histories of immigrant groups that are in very different stages of migration, it is demonstrated in this chapter that distinct migration flows are generated differently. This is often closely interrelated with developments in immigration policies. In the Moroccan case, state policies to recruit migrant workers stood at the base of migration flows, while in other cases other factors have produced migration flows with different characteristics.

Moreover, the Moroccan, Egyptian and Indian cases illustrate that there are substantial differences between migrants from specific countries in terms of generation, migration motives, religious background and education. The information presented in this chapter therefore also indicates that it is crucial not to consider migrants from the same country of origin as a homogeneous group, but to take this heterogeneity within migration groups into account if doing research or if developing policies on immigration and integration.

## 2. A SHORT HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO THE NETHERLANDS

After the Second World War, the Netherlands was a country of emigration. Officially encouraged by the state-sponsored emigration policy of the Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to typical immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent to Brazil and South Africa. Between 1946 and 1969, nearly half a million Dutch citizens left the Netherlands. After Indonesia's independence in 1949, the Netherlands experienced a massive influx of repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). In 2012, 377,618 first- and second-generation<sup>2</sup> immigrants with an Indonesian background lived in the Netherlands<sup>3</sup>.

A new migration pattern was established in the early 1960s with the arrival of the so-called guest workers from the Mediterranean. As the term guest worker implies, these labour migrants were expected to stay in the Netherlands temporarily and to return to their countries of origin once they had finished their jobs.

Initially, in the early 1960s, Spain, Italy, and Portugal were the main sending countries of guest workers to the Netherlands. Later, many guest workers from Turkey and Morocco arrived. The formal recruitment of guest workers ended with the oil crisis of 1973. Although some guest workers returned to their home countries, many decided to stay, particularly the

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<sup>2</sup> First generation migrants are people born abroad with at least one parent born abroad. Second generation migrants are born in the Netherlands and have at least one parent born abroad. In Dutch the term 'allochtoon' is used for both first and second generation 'migrants'.

<sup>3</sup> Statistics on the numbers of immigrants used in this chapter have been retrieved from Statistiscs Netherlands (<http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/>).

Turkish and Moroccan guest workers. Contrary to Germany which has also experienced the influx of guest workers, the Netherlands does not have large Italian or Spanish communities. Migration from Turkey and Morocco continued after official guest worker recruitment had been abandoned. New migrants came individually (partly illegal) or through formal family reunification. Later, many Turkish and Moroccan second generation youths brought spouses from their countries of origin. This created a large flow of marriage migration (also called migration for “family formation”).

The idea that guest workers and their families would return to their countries of origin, dominated official Dutch thinking on immigration and immigrant integration for many years (Van Amersfoort 1982; Muus 2004), but it appeared to be a myth.

In 2012, there were 392,923 first and second-generation migrants from Turkey in the Netherlands (197,107 born in Turkey, 195,816 born in the Netherlands with at least one Turkish parent). In the same year, there were 362,954 first and second-generation migrants from Morocco in the Netherlands (168,214 born in Morocco, 194,740 born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born in Morocco).

A third wave of massive immigration to the Netherlands occurred after the independence of Surinam, a former Dutch colony in South-America, in 1975. In the years following the independence of Surinam, almost 300,000 Surinamese persons – almost one third of the total population of the country – migrated to the Netherlands. In 2012, the Surinamese population in the Netherlands consisted of 346,797 persons (183,752 born in Surinam, 163,045 born in the Netherlands with at least one Surinamese parent). In the late 1980s, another wave of postcolonial migration started; the arrival of residents of the Dutch Antilles. As the Dutch Antilles are still part of the Netherlands, Antilleans are Dutch nationals and have free access to the Netherlands. In 2012, there were 143,992 Antilleans living in the Netherlands (82,693 born in the Antilles, the others born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born in the Dutch Antilles).

A fourth major wave of immigration to the Netherlands consists of asylum seekers. Up to the late 1980s, relatively few asylum seekers arrived in the Netherlands, but this changed in the early 1990s – particularly because of the wars in former Yugoslavia (1992-1995). In the period 1990-2001, the numbers of asylum seekers – with all fluctuations – increased strongly. In the years 1991-1992, about 21,000 individuals applied for asylum in the Netherlands annually. This number increased to about 43,000 in the years 1999-2000. After that, the number of asylum requests decreased steeply to 11,000 per year in the years 2003-2004. The main reason for the steep decline of the number of asylum seekers was the introduction of a new Aliens Act in 2001, which introduced stricter procedures for asylum seekers.

Over the years, asylum seekers arrived primarily from countries such as former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Angola, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. Between 2008 and 2012, the number of asylum requests rose again to about 15,000. Not all asylum requests have been granted.

In the early 1990s, almost half of all the requests were approved (particularly for refugees from former Yugoslavia). Later the approval rate of asylum requests decreased to a level of 10-12 per cent in the years after the introduction of the new Aliens Act (all figures from Engbersen et al. 2007). When an asylum seeker’s application for asylum is denied, he or she is requested to leave the country. However, not all rejected asylum seekers leave in practice. It is estimated that about 20 per cent of all rejected people remain in the Netherlands (De Boom et al. 2006; Engbersen et al. 2007).

A fifth type of migration to the Netherlands consists of the continuous influx of immigrants in the Netherlands from other Western countries (including other EU-countries). The total number of foreign-born residents from Western countries in the Netherlands increased from 440,000 in the early 1970s to almost 600,000 in the period 2005-2009. More than half of these immigrants from other Western countries came from other EU-countries. The number of immigrants from the other EU-countries increased strongly in recent years, particularly after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Ever since the early 1990s, at least 100,000 individuals born in Germany (with at least one German parent) reside in the Netherlands.

The influx of immigration to the Netherlands shows a gradual decline of immigration since the early 2000s, after the introduction of the new Aliens Act in 2001. However, in most recent years (2007-2008) there is again a steep increase of immigration to the country. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of immigrants was higher than in the late 1990s, when immigration to the Netherlands was at its peak and the Aliens Act was introduced shortly after. There are several reasons for this sudden increase of immigration flows. First, there is a sharp increase of immigration from other EU-countries, particularly after Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. In the period 2007-2008, about 20,000 immigrants per year from these three countries settled in the Netherlands, –almost one sixth of the total immigration in these years. Another important factor is the regularization of more than 20,000 previously rejected asylum seekers in 2007. In that year, asylum seekers whose asylum request was rejected, but who nevertheless had managed to stay in the Netherlands illegally, received a residence permit (Van Meeteren 2010). Third, return migration of Dutch emigrants has also increased in recent years, for reasons yet unknown.

In general, the figures presented above show three crucial developments in the immigration to the Netherlands (Snel et al. 2000; Engbersen et al. 2007). Firstly, there is a growing diversity in migration flows to the Netherlands. In the early 1970s, three quarters of all foreign-born residents in the Netherlands came from a limited number of other Western countries. Nowadays, two thirds of all foreign-born residents arrive from various non-Western countries. But also within the category of non-Western immigrants, there is a growing diversity. In the early 1970s, the majority of all non-Western immigrants came only from four non-Western countries, namely Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles, which have traditionally been the main sending countries to the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2007).

Recently, (2007-2008), the share of these four countries in the total non-Western immigration to the Netherlands fell to only 25 per cent. Between 2007 and 2008, immigration from countries such as Iraq, India, Somalia and China increased, whereas immigration from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles decreased. All of this makes clear that the trend of ‘super-diversity’, as Vertovec (2007) has shown to exist in the UK, can also be found in the Netherlands.

This relates to a second crucial trend in the immigration flows to the Netherlands, namely a ‘new geography’ of migration. There is an increase of long-distance migration to the Netherlands, from a growing number of countries. In addition, the traditional South-North migration is complemented by migration flows from east to west. A third general trend in contemporary migration patterns relates to new ‘types’ of migrants arriving in the Netherlands.

The traditional labour migrants, family migrants, and immigrants from former colonies and their offspring, all of whom generally had strong residence statuses, have increasingly become supplemented with new categories of immigrants with weaker residence statuses such as asylum seekers, temporary labour migrants (mainly from new EU-member states in Central and Eastern Europe), and irregular migrants (Engbersen et al. 2007). At the same time, the dividing lines between asylum seekers, commuting labour migrants, and irregular immigrants are sometimes diffuse.

### **3. SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN DUTCH IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES**

For decades, the Netherlands was a “reluctant country of immigration” (Cornelius et al. 1994). Although the Netherlands had a positive migration surplus since the early 1960s, successive governments officially denied that the Netherlands was a country of immigration. The official policy considered immigration as a temporary phenomenon. Only in 1998 did the Dutch government officially acknowledge that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration. This led to heated debates in the Dutch parliament, where several political parties opposed the idea of mass immigration to the Netherlands. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, and the rise of populist Dutch politicians like Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and more recently Geert Wilders, contributed to the deepening of the resistance in the Dutch public opinion and political debate against immigration and multiculturalism. “The Netherlands is full” and “multiculturalism has failed” have become common slogans. Since 2002, for the first time in Dutch political history, issues of immigration and immigrant integration play a dominant role in local and national elections and in the Dutch political debate (see e.g. De Koster et al. 2012; De Koster et al. 2010; Van der Waal et al. 2011; Van Meeteren 2005).

Migration and integration policies in the Netherlands have changed severely over the past forty years. Three phases can be distinguished in Dutch immigrant incorporation policies or what is now called ‘integration policies’ (Engbersen 2003). In each phase different aspects of ‘integration’ were emphasized. In the first phase (1970s-1980s), the emphasis was on self-organization and arrangements for education in minorities’ own languages. This multicultural emphasis was in line with the Dutch tradition of ‘pillarization’ (i.e. compartmentalization along socio-political lines). There were special arrangements for immigrants, financed by the state, such as Muslim and Hindu schools, and broadcasting and political consultation facilities for migrant communities. The immigrant integration policy aimed at mutual adaptation and equal opportunities for Dutch people and ethnic minorities in a multicultural society (WRR 1979).

The central idea of ‘integration while preserving ethnic identity’ became criticized in the 1990s because it might contribute to the unemployed and segregated position of many first and second generation immigrants from Morocco and Turkey. This introduced a second phase in Dutch integration policies. In the 1990s, the emphasis was put on reducing unemployment and welfare dependency, particularly through improving labour market participation. Integration was interpreted as equal participation in the major social institutions of society

(WRR 1989). However, multicultural policies were still important, on the national as well as on the local level.

The millennium change brought another change in the nature and idiom of integration policies and introduced a third phase. Active citizenship with a strong emphasis on the social obligations of citizenship and on the individual responsibility of citizens became the main goal. Integration policies became not only strongly related to issues such as shared norms about the rule of law and the obligation to know the Dutch language and culture, but also to social problems of public order and crime. Particularly after the 2002 elections, which were marked by the rise and death of Pim Fortuyn, integration policies became more assimilistic and immigration policies more selective (Entzinger 2002).

In the following section we describe the main changes to the Dutch immigration policies since the early 2000s (third phase). We do this by focussing on several domains: asylum migration, labour migration, family migration, irregular migration, return migration, integration and citizenship.

### 3.1. Asylum Migration

A foreign national will be granted asylum in the Netherlands if:

- the alien is refugee as defined in the 1951 Convention (and the 1967 New York Protocol);
- there is a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3, ECHR, CAT);
- s/he cannot, for pressing reasons of a humanitarian nature connected with the reasons for his departure from the country of origin, reasonably be expected, to return to his country of origin;
- the return to the country of origin would constitute an exceptional hardship in connection with the overall situation there, or;
- the alien is considered for family reunification.

As in other Western countries, asylum policy continues to be a thorny political issue. Following the large influx of asylum seekers in the 1990s, the Dutch State adopted a new Aliens Act in 2000. Its primary purpose was to develop a more efficient asylum policy that would not be as time-consuming as it had been before. It often took years before a final decision on an asylum request was made, especially if asylum seekers appealed against a negative decision or applied for other procedures in an effort to obtain a better status. The Aliens Act 2000 aimed to shorten the asylum procedures in three ways.

First, measurements were taken to simplify and accelerate the asylum procedure. After a 48 hours-assessment asylum seekers will be informed on a direct rejection or a preliminary acceptance of the request. The possibility to lodge an application for review was abolished. Instead, the alien can now present his view to the intended decision. The purpose of this new procedure is to make the first decision more meticulous. After this decision, the alien can lodge an appeal. With this new procedure, a decision on the asylum demand should be reached within 6 months.

Secondly, and most importantly, the Netherlands introduced a single asylum status. Prior to the Aliens Act 2000, the Netherlands had various asylum statuses with different rights and privileges depending on the grounds for asylum. As of April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2001, every asylum-seeker whose asylum request is approved receives the same temporary residence permit, regardless of the grounds for asylum. Each asylum-seeker who is admitted first receives a temporary residence permit for a maximum of five years. After a period of five years the permit can be converted into a permanent residence permit. Uniform rights and facilities are attached to this single status. All asylum migrants who have been admitted to the Netherlands (status holders) have the same rights.

During the procedure, asylum seekers have only a limited right to engage in paid employment and have no access to the Dutch national assistance system. The basic rationale behind this is that if asylum seekers were to actively participate in Dutch society, it would only be harder for them to leave again.

However, since 2008 the employment opportunities for asylum applicants have been expanded from 12 weeks per year to 24 weeks per year. Asylum applicants whose procedure runs for a shorter period than 6 months are still not allowed to work. Asylum seekers who have finalized their legal proceedings are themselves responsible for their return to their country of origin.

Between 2002 en 2005 several studies were carried out by the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Justice and a number of other organisations to evaluate the new asylum procedure. One of the main conclusions was that, during the research period, the new procedure did not quite succeed in reducing the time it takes to complete the asylum process.

## **3.2. Labour Migration**

The Dutch government prefers stimulating labour market participation of women and older employees over inviting foreign workers to the Netherlands. In the perception of the Dutch government, labour migration is only desirable for vacancies for which there are no Dutch job seekers or job seekers from other EU-countries available. An exception is made for highly skilled workers. In many cases, not only a temporary work permit is needed, but also a temporary residence permit. Labour migrants must obtain a temporary residence permit to stay for work before leaving their home country. Once in the Netherlands, this permit will be changed into a permit for the duration of the labour contract. Work permits are issued for a maximum period of three years. A temporary work permit can become permanent. After three years, the foreign worker becomes eligible for a residence permit stating 'no restrictions on work'. Around ten per cent of all work permits are issued for three years and could lead to permanent residence. Because the procedure of a so called provisional residence permit is relatively time-consuming, larger companies have the possibility to close an agreement with the immigration authorities. The ambition is to finalise the procedure within two weeks, under certain conditions.

### **3.2.1. Highly Skilled Migrants**

Starting in October 2004, the Dutch government has relaxed the admission rules for highly-skilled migrants coming to the Netherlands. A more liberal entry policy is pursued for



certain (highly qualified) labour groups who will get straightforward access to permanent residence because of their positive (financial) contribution to the Dutch economy and society, while at the same time, the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are considered on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 2003).

Foreign workers are considered highly skilled if they earn a certain amount of income. Unlike other countries, the Netherlands does not use a list of occupations which are considered to be highly skilled. The general income criterion from January 1<sup>st</sup> 2012 onward is a salary of at least € 51,239 gross. If under 30 years of age it is € 37,575 and if it concerns a recently graduated student, it is € 26,931 gross (within one year after graduation). Highly skilled foreign workers receive a residence permit for a period of five years if they are in possession of, or about to be granted, a work contract of unlimited duration. If a highly skilled migrant has a work contract for a limited period only, the residence permit will be granted for the duration of the contract, with a maximum of five years. The immigration authorities supply the immigrant with the residence permit: a separate work permit is not needed. The whole procedure should take two weeks. After five years these labour migrants are eligible to receive a permanent residence permit.

Until 2006, foreign students had limited opportunities to stay and find work in the Netherlands after graduating or receiving a degree. In fact, foreign students from outside the EU were often requested to leave the country directly after completing their studies. In 2009, a new admission scheme for highly educated migrants was introduced. Pursuant to this scheme, highly-educated foreign nationals who have attained at least a Master's degree can obtain a residence permit with a maximum term of 1 year in the Netherlands in order to find a job as a highly-skilled migrant or to start an innovative company.

The foreign national who wants to take advantage of this scheme, will be tested on the basis of a scoring system. The British scoring system of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme was used as a model for the Dutch scoring system. The foreign national will be tested on education, age, and indicators for success in the Netherlands. Highly-educated migrants who wish to make use of this scheme will not be assessed with regard to their means of existence. Making use of public funds during the 1 year term of the residence permit (the so-called orientation year) may have consequences for this residence permit. If the highly-educated person wishes to bring his or her family members to the Netherlands as well, the regular requirements regarding family reunification (including sufficient means of existence) will apply. As soon as the highly-educated person has found a job making him or her eligible for a highly-skilled migrant status, i.e. within a term of at most 1 year, s/he can convert the one-year residence permit into a residence permit for highly-skilled migrants. The highly-educated person may also start an innovative company in the Netherlands within the orientation year. If he has succeeded within one year, he may request conversion of the residence permit into a residence permit to work on the basis of self-employment. Finally, to make working in the Netherlands more attractive to highly qualified workers, the spouses, partners and underage children can also obtain a residence permit.

### **3.3. Family Migration**

Dutch legislation concerning family migration distinguishes between family reunification and family formation. Family reunification concerns a relationship that already existed in the

country of origin. For example, if a man from Morocco migrates to the Netherlands, and brings his wife and children later on, this is called family reunification. If the man had migrated to the Netherlands while he was still single, and he married during his stay in the Netherlands and his partner then migrates to the Netherlands, this would be labelled family formation. In the eyes of the Dutch government, family migration should be limited. It is stated that, as a result of on-going family migration, new, often poorly-educated, immigrants continuously enter Dutch society where they have limited opportunities on the labour market. In addition, family formation is often taken as evidence of poor integration of immigrants into Dutch society.

In 2004, the regulations for family formation were tightened. The minimum age for family formation was set at 21 years, where it had previously been 18 years. The minimum income requirement for family formation was increased from 100% to 120% of the official minimum subsistence level. With this income requirement, the Dutch government intended to prevent the use of taxpayer's money to financially support partners or other family members coming to the Netherlands. The person already resident in the Netherlands – the referee – literally functions as the guarantor for the family and the partner. However, in March 2010 this income requirement was abolished because the European Court judged that it contradicted law on family reunification.

With the new Civic Integration Abroad Act of March 2006, foreign nationals between the ages of 16 and 65 coming to the Netherlands for family formation or reunification as well as immigrants who wish to reside in the Netherlands as a spiritual leader or religious teacher, must pass a civic integration test prior to entering the Netherlands. These newcomers need to have acquired basic knowledge of both the Dutch language and Dutch society before they arrive in the Netherlands. Their knowledge will be examined through a paid test taken in the Dutch embassy or consulate in the newcomer's country of origin (or current country of residence) where the migrant applies for a provisional residence permit. As of March 2008, the requirements for passing the exam have been adjusted. The participant will have to answer more questions correctly in order to pass the exam. Only migrants who pass the test are eligible for a provisional residence permit that is necessary to enter the Netherlands. EU nationals and nationals from a specific group of industrialised countries are exempted from this test. Other exceptions are nationals who:

- are under 18 years,
- are nationals of Surinam and can prove that they have undertaken basic education in the Dutch language either in Surinam or the Netherlands,
- come to the Netherlands for a temporary objective, such as study, au pair, exchange, medical treatment,
- are family members of someone having an asylum-related residence permit,
- have a work permit, are self-employed, or highly skilled migrants.

Family members of an asylum applicant who has been admitted to the Netherlands on the basis of an asylum application may be considered for derivative residence permits. If there are no documents, the foreign national is responsible for demonstrating that there is a family relationship in a different way. One of the possibilities is to have a DNA test conducted.

Since 19 October 2008, the assessing of applications to extend a residence permit for family reunification has been simplified. In the past, the foreign national and/or the person

with whom the foreign national would stay, had to prove that they had sufficient means of existence. This implied that the foreign national had to submit proof of income. From October 2008 on, it will only be refused if the foreign national or the person with whom this foreign national stays partly or entirely relies on public funds.

### 3.4. Irregular Migration

An immigrant is considered illegal if he has no right to stay (lawful residence) in accordance with art. 8 of the Aliens Act. If the immigration authorities do not grant him or her asylum or provide a temporary residence permit and if the immigrant does not leave the country when ordered to, he or she becomes illegal. While most irregular migrants have entered the country via regular channels, some have entered the country in an unauthorised way.

While there has been much political debate about the question if illegal entry or stay should be considered an offense under Dutch law, it is currently not punishable (Broeders 2009). Irregular immigrants may be detained – under specific conditions and with access to remedies and judicial review – and expelled on the basis of the Dutch Aliens Act. For families with children, some special arrangements are made. Thus, in a legal sense this type of detention is an administrative matter and not a penal measure. In enforcement priority is given to persons causing public order disturbances or to those who are involved in crime. Furthermore, irregular migrants are not held in regular prisons, but in special detention centres or expulsion centres. From 1994 to 2009, the number of immigrants held in custody because of immigration laws has more than quadrupled to 1,750 persons. This increase was partly aided by the construction of special repatriation centres at Schiphol and Rotterdam-The Hague Airport.

Although the goal of imprisonment is expulsion, in the Netherlands, less than half of the detained irregular migrants are effectively expelled from the country (Van Kalmthout et al. 2005 cited in Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1602). In the Netherlands, the detention capacity increased from fewer than a thousand places to 3,100 in 2007 (Van Kalmthout 2007). The Dutch government holds irregular migrants in detention centres in the hope that they will reveal their identity or at least be cooperative in establishing it. According to Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 1596) irregular migrants can only be expelled “when identity, nationality, and (preferably) migration history can be established.” These authors discern two categories of detainees who raise problems for expulsion polices. First, migrants who refuse to cooperate and frustrate the progress of procedures, for example by stating a false name or by supplying an incorrect country of origin. The second group consists of migrants who cooperate in acquiring the relevant travel documents, but who cannot return because the authorities in their countries of origin refuse to accept them or because of specific political problems there (Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1602).

The number of irregular migrants estimated to reside in the Netherlands in 2005 is at least 120.000 (Van der Heijden et al. 2006). The EU expansion had a large influence on the number of irregular migrants: it was only after the EU expansion in 2004 and 2007 that irregular residence diminished from about 200,000 to about 120,000, mostly because immigrants from the new member States can now come to stay in a legal way. Many irregular migrants come to the Netherlands on tourist visa and overstay these, others cross the border

illegally or become illegal when they are refused refugee status (Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Staring 2001; Van Meeteren 2010). There are some figures on the number of expelled (asylum) migrants, but it is not clear if for example the asylum seekers who during checks of addresses are not present, have actually left the Netherlands.

While the Dutch government is actively trying to exclude and deport irregular migrants, they do have some rights that are partly rooted in supranational agreements and international human rights discourses. They for example have the right to imperative medical care and publicly financed legal assistance, and children have the right to education (Bafekr 1999; Kromhout et al. 2008; Van der Leun 2003b; 2006).

Governments have two types of policies at their disposal to control irregular immigration: policies aimed at controlling the external borders and policies aimed at guarding the internal boundaries. These two types of control are discussed in the following sections.

### ***3.4.1. External Control Policies***

Initially, restrictive policies to prevent and control irregular migration were mainly targeted at the external borders. With the implementation of the Schengen treaty, controlling the Dutch borders has become less of an issue, but controlling the European borders has stepped up in importance. Visa requirements have become stricter, and physical barriers were erected along the land borders of Europe in order to keep people out (Albrecht 2002). Walls similar to those along the Mexican-US border (Andreas 2000) can be found in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco and along the new EU borders in Poland. These walls have been strengthened with guards, watch towers, fences and state of the art technology (Broeders 2009).

Yet in spite of all the increased efforts that have been made, border controls have proved only partially effective in controlling irregular immigration (Brochmann 1999b; Cornelius 2005). This is because many irregular migrants enter legally and only become irregular migrants while in the receiving society: once their visas expire or when they are denied asylum (Black et al. 2005; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Van Meeteren et al. 2008), and, even if migrants are apprehended, they have proved difficult to expel (Van der Leun 2003b). Furthermore, human smugglers constantly find new ways to circumvent controls (Heckmann 2004; Pijpers and Van der Velde 2007), for example by changing operating routes (Okólski 2000). Research indicates that smuggling fees have doubled since 2001 and that irregular migrants from Somalia now pay an average amount of 7,000 dollars and migrants from Iraq between 3,000 and 10,000 dollars to come to the Netherlands (Van Liempt 2007). The result of these increased costs is that irregular migrants tend to stay as long as possible once they get in, whilst migrants from visa-free countries may come repeatedly, but also leave again voluntarily after a short period of time.

As said, many irregular migrants come on a tourist visa which they then overstay. The regular tourist visa (C-visa) can be attained at the Schengen country of destination and is valid for three months. The visa procedure is more restrictive for persons with specific characteristics (nationality, sex, age) or with 'weak ties' to their country of origin (unemployment, family situation). To obtain a tourist visa, several conditions have to be met – depending on the country of origin. A few examples are:

- A letter proving the goal of the stay (e.g. invitation by family members);
- Bank transcriptions of the past months and proof one has enough money to sustain him or herself during the stay. Also money for the journey elsewhere or back to the home country is required;
- Travel insurance with minimally €30.000 coverage.

If an irregular migrant who came to the Netherlands on a tourist visa wants to obtain access to the legal labour market and an employer is willing to apply for a work permit, the migrant first has to return to his home country until the permits are issued. This comes with large risks: migrants who overstay their visa and try to return to their home country are regularly being fined, receive a deportation stamp in their passports and their information is entered into the Schengen Information System (SIS). Once a migrants name enters in SIS, he or she becomes a persona non grata for the Schengen countries with little chance to get a Schengen visa on the same name ever again. Due to this regulation, many illegal labour migrants have become trapped in the Netherlands (Kramer, 2008).

### ***3.4.2. Internal Control Policies***

As irregular migrants cannot be stopped from entering the country, the aim has increasingly become to exclude them from formal institutions and to discourage them in the hope that they might leave voluntarily. A wide array of policy measures have been implemented in order to do so (Broeders 2009). Examples include exclusion from public services, surveillance by the police, policies of identification, detention and expulsion, and labour market control.

In 1991, the use of social-fiscal numbers – the ‘entry ticket’ to legitimate work - was barred for irregular immigrants. Furthermore, employers are sanctioned heavily if found guilty of employing illegally residing immigrants (Broeders 2009). If an employer employs a foreign national without a work permit, he will receive a penalty of €8,000 for each illegal foreign national. Private persons will receive a penalty of €4,000. The Labour Inspection (who enforces the Labour Act for Foreign Nationals) performs approximately 10,000 inspections a year with 200 inspectors. These inspections are performed on the basis of a risk analysis and particularly in risk sectors.

In a reaction to a publication concerning illegal stay in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice presented a new policy on the illegal stay of immigrants on June 20, 2008. Priority is given to illegally residing immigrants committing criminal offences or causing trouble. Policy on these aliens is based on the idea of ‘departure or detention’. If return is not yet possible, all efforts are aimed at putting or keeping them in detention. In 2007, approximately 13% of the total Dutch penitentiary capacity was intended for the detention of irregular immigrants (Van Kalmthout 2007:103). Moreover, aliens for which an indication exists that they have been staying illegally in the Netherlands, will be restricted in their freedom of movement and will be obliged to report to the authorities twice a day. Detention of aliens will be enforced more often in the case of aliens who have exhausted all legal remedies and repeat their asylum applications without presenting new facts/developments or circumstances. There will also be an increased focus on vulnerable groups of illegally residing immigrants.

While the national government has enacted policies to exclude irregular migrants, local authorities have usually been left to cope with the problem of their continuous presence. In the Netherlands, the government even formally forbids the local authorities to provide aid to

irregular migrants. Local organizations are subsidized for taking care of homeless people and to provide food to people in need, but they only receive government funding for people who reside legally (Rusinovic et al. 2002). Any aid provided to irregular migrants therefore has to be privately financed. Organizations therefore tend to be secretive about the help they provide and only do so in locations tucked away in areas outside of the city centre and out of sight of the general public (Van Meeteren 2010).

### **3.4.3. The ‘General Pardon’ of 2007**

In recent years, there were lengthy political debates on the issue of rejected asylum seekers who were still residing in the country, either still awaiting their decision or already illegal. In 2006 the Association of Dutch municipalities and various social organizations asked the Dutch government to grant amnesty to those asylum seekers who lodged their initial asylum request before April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2001 and who still resided in the Netherlands. Until 2006, the government maintained that a ‘General Pardon’ for this category of asylum seekers was undesirable and that rejected asylum seekers should leave the country. After the elections of 2006, a new government was installed which contained a majority of proponents of this measure. This government decided for an amnesty which came into effect June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2007. The ‘General pardon’ gives those foreign nationals in the Netherlands a residence permit if they:

- Submitted their initial application for asylum before 1 April 2001 (before the New Aliens Act of 2000 came into effect);
- Have resided continuously in the Netherlands since April 1<sup>st</sup> 2001;
- Are not suspected of war crime;
- Don’t have criminal antecedents in the Netherlands;
- Have not repeatedly given false information about their identity; and
- Stop any pending legal procedures against the Dutch state when accepting residence under this regulation.

Around 28,000 individuals have received a residence permit in the Netherlands as a consequence of the ‘General pardon’. On the other hand, 6000 foreign nationals were refused a residence permit. If an irregular migrant does not meet the criteria for the ‘General pardon’, he or she has to return.

## **3.5. Return Migration**

Return policies under the revised Aliens Act of 2000 imply faster and shorter procedures. Already at the start of the asylum procedure, asylum seekers will be notified about the possibility that his request might not be accepted and s/he will have to return. The alien will be informed about the feasibility of his asylum request within five workdays. After a final decision, the asylum seeker has four weeks to arrange his departure. Rejected asylum seekers are responsible themselves for leaving the country on time. Assistance with return within voluntary return programmes, offered by IOM on behalf of the Dutch authorities, is available to all those asylum seekers. Financial assistance can for example be provided if rejected asylum seekers are not able to pay for the journey themselves. After this period, the official

reception will be ended and the authorities may enforce return by expulsion without further issuance of orders. Since January 2007, a special service, called the Service on Return and Departure fosters these departures.

Twenty-eight days after the alien has been informed that s/he must leave the country, a check is performed to establish if this has actually happened. An 'address check' at the last known address of the alien is carried out. The alien is considered to be 'administratively removed' if s/he is not encountered at the address and it is assumed that s/he has departed. In the majority of cases this implies 'departure with unknown destination'. If the alien is found at the last known address after 28 days and forced return is possible, then the person is taken into custody and expelled or forced to depart under supervision. In the case of expulsion the alien is taken across the border under supervision and if necessary transported to the country of origin. In case of departure under supervision an alien can leave the country alone, but their travel documents are taken in and only given back at the place where the alien leaves the country.

If forced return is not possible, the alien can be evicted from their home or from reception centres for asylum seekers. In practice, it is therefore possible that rejected asylum seekers end up on the street. Without any formal support they have to survive by themselves, sometimes with help from so-called informal social safety nets (organized by, for example, churches or other private organizations). In 2009, the government reported an increased number of migrants who departed from the Netherlands following the official departure procedure. There was also an observable increase in the number of migrants that had independently departed from the Netherlands with the support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The government committed itself to improve the possibilities for foreign nationals to return, regardless of them having criminal records or not.

### **3.6. Policies on Civic Integration**

Since 1998, the Netherlands has a Civic Integration Programme for newly arrived immigrants ('newcomers'). Immigrants who come to the Netherlands are obliged to fulfil the civic integration obligation by passing an integration exam. The assumption is that by learning the Dutch language and some aspects about Dutch society, immigrants are better prepared to participate in Dutch society in general and the labour market in particular. In 2006 and 2007, the Dutch civic integration policies were drastically changed. The essence of the new measures is that the integration of non-Western immigrants is to be accelerated by making civic integration more compulsory. The changes are twofold. Firstly, the Civic Integration Abroad Act that came into effect in March 2006. Secondly, a new Civic Integration Act that was introduced on January 1st 2007. Both are described hereafter.

#### ***3.6.1. Civic Integration Abroad Act***

The Civic Integration Abroad Act holds that foreign nationals between the ages of 18 and 65 who come to the Netherlands for non-temporary purposes, such as marriage or family reunification as well as those who want to reside here as a spiritual leader or religious teacher, must pass a civic integration test prior to entering the Netherlands. In other words, these newcomers need to have acquired basic knowledge of both the Dutch language and Dutch society before they arrive in the Netherlands. Their knowledge will be tested with an exam,

taken in the Dutch embassy or consulate in the newcomer's country of origin (or current country of residence) where the migrant applies for a provisional residence permit. Only migrants who pass the test are eligible for a provisional residence permit. Exempted from this exam are EU nationals and nationals from a specific group of countries<sup>4</sup>. As of March 2008, the requirements for passing the exam have been adjusted. The participant will have to answer more questions correctly in order to pass the exam.

### ***3.6.2. The New Civic Integration Act***

This new act regulates that civic integration is obligatory for both newcomers and 'oldcomers'. The latter category is defined as non-Dutch nationals between 18 and 65 years old living in the Netherlands, who did not live in the country during the time span for compulsory education (in the Netherlands from 4 to 16 years) for at least eight years. Non-Dutch nationals who do not fulfil this requirement and do not have a certificate showing they have sufficient command of the Dutch language, have to fulfil their integration obligation by passing a civic integration test within three and a half or five years. This exam replaced the requirement of obliged participation in a civic integration program. A passed integration exam is a condition for naturalization. Nationals from the EU and EER are exempted but the other exempted nationals for the civic integration abroad need to pass civic integration in the Netherlands.

The minimum level for writing and speaking for newcomers and 'oldcomers' are based on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEF). The introduction of the compulsory civic integration exam enables local authorities responsible for the implementation of civic integration to enforce sanctions (e.g. an administrative fine) when participants fail to pass the test.

Another major change in the Dutch system of civic integration is that individual participants themselves are in principle responsible for their own civic integration trajectories. Municipalities can play a role in informing participants about existing integration courses offered by education institutes or private suppliers of language and other courses. Participants can decide what course they will take if they follow a course of their own choice. The only obligation is that participants fulfil their obligation within the fixed period. At the start of the civic integration program it was free for participants but later they had to finance their own civic integration course. They were eligible for a loan covering the costs.

The execution of the Civic Integration Act showed major difficulties. Therefore, the act was revised in 2007 under the Civic Integration Delta Plan. The participant now pays a personal contribution of €270, to stress the 'own responsibility' to integrate. In 2008, the Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration notified the House of Representatives that these efforts had not yet received the desired result, particularly in the four large cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht where approximately 50% of the foreign nationals who are obliged to participate in civic integration programmes live. For this reason the Minister announced additional measures and the Act was amended to such an extent that the foreign nationals who were obliged to participate in civic integration programmes could be forced to accept the civic integration facility offered by the municipality. A municipality is now permitted to impose a maximum fine of €500 if the foreign national – imputably – fails

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<sup>4</sup>Switzerland, Monaco, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Vatican City, US and South-Korea.



to do this within the stipulated period of four weeks. The Civic Integration examination is a condition for granting a permanent residence permit.

### 3.7. Policies on Citizenship

The last decade, (laws on) nationality and citizenship were topic of lengthy debates in the Netherlands. The Law of the realm on Dutch Citizenship regulates the subject of Dutch nationality. For immigrants, obtaining Dutch citizenship is possible through two procedures: the naturalization regulation and the option regulation. To obtain Dutch citizenship through naturalization foreign nationals have to meet the following conditions:

- They have to be of age;
- They have to have lived in the Netherlands for an uninterrupted period of five years with a valid residence permit on time;
- They have to be sufficiently integrated in Dutch society and able to read, write, speak and understand Dutch. This must be proven by passing a civic integration exam;
- In the last four years they must not have been given any custodial sentence, training order, community service order or high monetary penalty;
- They have to be prepared to give up their current nationality. If they do not give up their current nationality, if asked, Dutch nationality may be revoked;
- They have to have a residence permit for a non-temporary objective, such as family reunification.

Becoming Dutch via the naturalization procedure will take 6 months up to a year. The ‘option regulation’ takes up to three months. If someone belongs to one of eight categories, he may ‘opt’ for Dutch nationality. The idea is that these non-Dutch nationals are already at home in the country and they do not have to pass an integration exam. It is not compulsory to abandon his other nationality. The municipality of residence decides whether or not someone is eligible for the option regulation.

As of 2006, candidates will officially receive the Dutch nationality if they are present at a so-called obliged ‘naturalization ceremony’. With this ceremony the Dutch government wants to emphasize the importance of obtaining Dutch citizenship. The aim is to strengthen the immigrants’ link and loyalty to Dutch society. The naturalization day is on December 15<sup>th</sup>, Kingdom day.

A ‘Statement of Allegiance’ has been the final act of this ceremony since 1 March 2009. Anyone who wants to be considered for the acquisition of Dutch citizenship must declare himself or herself willing to make a Statement of Allegiance. By making this Statement, he or she states to respect the freedoms and rights attached to Dutch citizenship.

Other adjustments from 2009 onwards are, firstly, the possibility to withdraw the Dutch citizenship because of causing severe damage to the essential interests of the Dutch Kingdom. Spying, for example, is one of these severe damages, as mentioned in the European Nationality pact. Secondly, minor children who are acknowledged by a Dutch citizen after birth and who are younger than 7 years of age will acquire Dutch citizenship immediately, just as this was the case prior to April 1<sup>st</sup> 2003. The same applies to minor children who are legitimized by a Dutch citizen without acknowledgement. On May 1<sup>st</sup> 2009, the requirement regarding the submission of documents establishing nationality and identity was tightened.

The subject of double nationality became of sudden importance in 2007 when two candidate-members of the Government had, and still have a double nationality. Starting point of Dutch law is to limit plural nationalities, because a single nationality enhances a clear legal status, which is defined by the nationality of that person.


In principle, one has to abandon his original nationality, but there are some exceptions to this rule. Some countries, for example Morocco, do not allow citizens to abandon the nationality of the country of origin.

#### 4. IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

Having discussed these policies, structuring immigration and integration, we now zoom in on six strategically selected countries from which people have migrated to the Netherlands. These six migrant groups mirror the increasing diversity of migration to the Netherlands. They come from different continents (Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia), vary in size, and represent different stages of migration to Dutch society.

In the following subsections we will see that migration from Morocco expanded decades ago and as a result, Moroccans in the Netherlands currently form a large immigrant community.

At present however, the migration flow is declining. Migration from Brazil on the other hand is still growing rapidly. Migration flows from Ukraine and Bangladesh are much smaller in size and they have more recently begun to get started.



Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Figure 1. Number of first generation Bangladeshi immigrants in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2012.

In addition, while Ukrainian migration flows have the potential to increase, flows from Bangladesh are more likely to stagnate. Egyptians form a middle-sized, divided (along religious lines) community in the Netherlands that has been established for years, with little further growth. Migration flows from India are diverse, consisting of a recently started and expanding flow of highly-skilled workers and an established group of Surinamese with roots in India. For each of these immigrant group, we delve into their immigration history by showing different types of data stemming from statistical sources as well as in-depth interviews with experts.

#### **4.1. Bangladesh**

According to the official data of Statistics Netherlands, there are only 781 first generation Bangladeshi migrants who live in the Netherlands. Figure 1 shows that the population of first generation Bangladeshis in the Netherlands has slowly grown over the last years.

According to these same data, there are another 764 second generation Bangladeshis who reside in the Netherlands. This means that there are a little over 1,500 officially registered Bangladeshis in the Netherlands. However, our informants estimate that the number of Bangladeshis in the Netherlands is much higher than that. According to a Bangladeshi migrant organisation located in the Netherlands, the number lies somewhere between 4,500 and 5,000. Another Bangladeshi organisation estimates the number to be at least 2,500. According to an educated guess of government officials and migration experts, the number of Bangladeshis in the Netherlands was 2,500 shortly after the turn of the century (Siddiqui 2003).

There are two important reasons for the large differences between the official numbers on the one hand and the estimations on the other. The first has to do with the fact that Bangladesh only became an independent nation in 1971. Between 1947 and 1971, Bangladesh was a province of Pakistan. This means that Bangladeshis who were born between 1947 and 1971 are registered as Pakistanis. The second reason why the official numbers deviate from the expert estimations is that there are a number of irregular migrants among the Bangladeshi population. These are primarily men, as females bring shame to their families in Bangladesh if they migrate (Dannecker 2005). Men travel on their own and only bring their wives once they have settled down and managed to legalise their status. It is difficult to say how many there are, but our informants say that the number of irregular Bangladeshi has been declining over the last years due to changes in government policies. Because of these changes, it has become very difficult for irregular Bangladeshi migrants to settle down and find a job in the Netherlands. They prefer to go to Portugal, Spain, Italy or UK because it is easier to get an illegal job there. Between 1997 and 2003, the police arrested 94 irregular Bangladeshi migrants. Most arrests took place in Amsterdam and at the airport.

According to our informants and as confirmed by statistics, in the last three to four years Bangladeshis have been leaving the Netherlands. There are several reasons for this trend. First, there are older migrants who return to Bangladesh to retire. As explained before, these do not show up in the official statistics because they were born in Pakistan. Second, our informants tell us that many Bangladeshi entrepreneurs are leaving for the UK and Belgium. They prefer to go there because controls on illegal work and tax payments in the Netherlands have become very strict. In the UK and Belgium it is easier to start a business and to avoid

paying taxes. If they head for Belgium, they especially move to Antwerp. They do very good business there because they can hire employees illegally and because they can keep part of their business off the books. For this group of migrants the Netherlands is no longer a lucrative country so if they get the chance they leave. Third, Bangladeshis leave the Netherlands because it has become very difficult for Bangladeshis to marry in Bangladesh and bring their partner to the Netherlands. Aggravated requirements for family formation make this procedure arduous and lengthy. Bangladeshis who want to marry someone from Bangladesh therefore go to Belgium and the UK because the procedures are easier in these countries. Fourth, for the UK as a specific destination, there are two additional reasons why Bangladeshis in the Netherlands go there. The first is that they want to give their children a good education and they think it is better in the UK than in the Netherlands. The second is that there are no possibilities for children to learn Bangla as a second language in the Netherlands, while these are plentiful in the UK.

Although the official data indicate that the number of Bangladeshi immigrants has been relatively stable or even growing in the last few years, our informants indicate that the number is in fact declining. They assert that there are still migrants who come to Europe in spite of all the restrictions, but the Netherlands is not a target country for Bangladeshi migrants anymore. A possible reason for the increase in Bangladeshi immigration in 2008 and 2009 that is visible in the statistics could be the amnesty for asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers that was issued in 2007. Our informants indicate that there were some Bangladeshis who received this amnesty. This means that they are not newly arrived migrants, but earlier migrants who have managed to legalise their status. This does not mean that there are no new arrivals though. There are still migrants in southern European countries who have a legal status there but they want to come here because the wages are higher.

According to the official data, the Bangladeshi migration flow to the Netherlands has been relatively small in size. If we consider the fact that Bangladeshis in the Netherlands are leaving because of the lack of Bangla language facilities and attractive employment options, it seems that Bangladeshi migration is not likely to expand rapidly in the near future. Bangladeshi migrants in the Netherlands have never really formed a migrant community with migrant organisations, and they therefore lack all kinds of immigrant community facilities. In combination with the less attractive business climate, it is therefore likely that the Bangladeshi migration flow to the Netherlands will stagnate.

#### ***4.1.1. Migration History and Motives of Bangladeshi Immigrants***

According to one of our informants, the first Bangladeshi migrant who arrived in the Netherlands had first come to England by boat and from there he continued to the Netherlands in 1963. Later that same year, a handful of other Bangladeshis arrived who had also travelled through England. After 1971, when Bangladesh was liberated from Pakistan, a few Bangladeshi migrants arrived, again via England. These pioneer migrants were students, artists, diplomats and political dissidents (see also Knights and King 1998). In 1975, one family applied for and received political asylum.

Bangladeshi migration to the Netherlands started to grow between 1985 and the early nineties. Mainly young men in their late twenties or early thirties arrived during this period. All of them applied for political asylum and most of them succeeded.

Some had indeed migrated for political reasons while other migrants had been inspired by economic motives (see also Khondker 2004). According to our informants, this appears to be the most prominent wave of Bangladeshi migrants to the Netherlands.

From the early nineties onwards, Bangladeshi immigration to Europe took off and the Netherlands was one of the target destinations. This was a large flow consisting largely of young men. Among them was a large number of false asylum applicants. They claimed to belong to a minority group in Bangladesh which they did not.

Most asylum requests were denied and the Bangladeshi applicants continued their lives in the Netherlands as irregular migrants or they tried to apply for asylum in other European countries.

Bangladeshi migrants who came during the nineties started to work in restaurants or to do cleaning work. After a few years of hard labour many became restaurant owners in Dutch large cities. This way, migrants who came through illegal channels managed to settle down legally. At that time it was easier to become legalised than it is today.

In the mid-nineties many young Bangladeshis received amnesty and some engaged in bogus marriages in order to receive a legal status. Apart from these larger flows, there were some minor flows of individuals who migrated to the Netherlands because they are professionals and had job opportunities in the Netherlands. After a few years they applied for permanent residency. In addition, there have been and continue to be some Bangladeshi students, but their numbers have never been large. Research by Siddiqui (2003) indicates that migrants are attracted to Europe by better educational opportunities for their children, access to specialised jobs, better health care systems and wider opportunities for 'self-actualization'.

Our informants give similar accounts to those of Knights and King (1998: 305), who assert that Bangladeshis appear "surfers riding the waves of opportunity sweeping them from one part of Europe to another. Asylum opportunities, amnesties, immigrant training schemes, study bursaries, legislative loopholes, lax border controls, friendly administrations and, of course, job opportunities were the incentives luring Bangladeshis first to one country or city and then to another." Before they leave Bangladesh, migrants collect information on where the best possibilities are to be found. Currently, migrants prefer to go to Southern European countries like Spain or Italy because it is relatively easy to find illegal employment and to legalise their status there. During the eighties and early nineties the Netherlands was an attractive country to go to apply for asylum. If they were denied, they would re-apply in another European country. This is not possible anymore because fingerprints are now registered in a European database.

#### ***4.1.2. Policy Changes in the Netherlands Affecting Bangladeshi Immigrants***

In the Netherlands, several policy changes have made life for Bangladeshis more complicated. Our informants speak of increased controls on illegal employment and tax payments which have become so frequent that Bangladeshi entrepreneurs can no longer keep illegal workers in their restaurants, and that they can no longer keep revenues off the books. The fines have also become very high, sometimes up to 24.000 euro. This is the main reason why Bangladeshis stop to do business in the Netherlands and move to the UK or Belgium.

Furthermore, it has become more difficult to obtain a legal status. In the past, many bogus marriages took place. As this has become more difficult, it hardly occurs anymore. Asylum requests are rejected on the first day and as fingerprints are registered it has become more difficult to live as an irregular migrant after that without running the risk of being expelled

once caught. In addition, it is very difficult to bring family members, a spouse, or a friend from Bangladesh to the Netherlands. The Dutch embassy in Bangladesh has a reputation for being strict. Some students manage to get a student visa but it is very difficult to get a tourist visa or family reunion or formation. Bangladeshis who want to marry a Bangladeshi spouse therefore tend to move to other countries.

#### ***4.1.3. Political and Economic Shifts in Bangladesh***

Bangladesh was colonised by the British until 1947. Pakistan's neo-colonial rule over Bangladesh lasted until 1971 when Bangladesh became an independent nation. A few years later, military dictatorship gained power in Bangladesh. Civilian rule was returned in 1990 and transformed the country into a parliamentary democracy (Van Schendel 2009). Bangladesh is still a very poor country. Half of the population lives below the official poverty line. Wages are low and corruption and bureaucracy make life frustrating. Two-thirds of Bangladeshis work in agriculture, a sector generating only one-fifth of GDP. Furthermore, employment options for young well-educated people in Bangladesh are limited, while the level of education of the population has grown (Zeilyn 2006).

As there are not jobs for everyone, the Bangladesh government actively promotes labour emigration. Labour migration is seen as a way to alleviate unemployment and to generate foreign income (Jureidini 2001, cited in De Bruyn and Kuddus 2005). Bangladesh is now one of the major labour-sending countries of the world (Siddiqui 2005). Although the Bangladesh government actively promotes labour migration of Bangladeshi men, laws have been put forward since the 1980s to keep women from emigrating (Dannecker 2005). It was argued that women's honour could only be protected if women were not allowed to leave their families. In 1988 the order was lifted which led to an increase of women's migration. In 1997 a new ban was announced, which was even stricter than the first, making "autonomous migration, which means crossing the border without male guardians", absolutely forbidden (Dannecker 2005:657). This ban on female emigration has now been released again but the recruitment procedure remains more complicated for women than for men (Dannecker 2005), and women under 35 are still not allowed to migrate on their own (Siddiqui 2005). Due to these restrictions, few women migrate as contract workers (only 2% of the total flow). Instead, they primarily move as irregular migrants (De Bruyn and Kuddus 2005; Dannecker 2005).

#### ***4.1.4. The Bangladeshi Community in the Netherlands***

Most Bangladeshis in the Netherlands live in urban areas like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven and Groningen. There are a good number of educated professionals in Eindhoven because of the Electronics corporation Philips. In terms of migration, there are no links between specific sending areas in Bangladesh and receiving areas in the Netherlands. Bangladeshis in the Netherlands come from all over Bangladesh.

Many Bangladeshis have started their own business. They do this because options are otherwise often limited to cleaning or production work. They start restaurants, cleaning businesses, small supermarkets, import-export businesses, and some trade in textiles. Most Indian restaurants in the Netherlands are in fact Bangladeshi-owned. There is no system according to which Bangladeshis help each other to set up a business.

Our informants refer to Bangladeshis in the Netherlands as a 'tight community'. They say Bangladeshis highly value this community and that social bonds are strong. For the older

generation, there is also a strong sense of district identity. In addition, regular and irregular migrants associate with each other. The irregular migrants usually work for the regular migrants and they pay them less than minimum wage but our informants say that people are generally treated well. They are paid enough money so that they can send remittances. The Bangladeshi population in the Netherlands is largely comprised of men, many of whom are single. According to the official data in 2009, 219 Bangladeshi first generation men are not married whilst 80 are. For women this is the other way around as 98 are not married whereas 214 are. Families in the Netherlands are not very large.

#### ***4.1.5. Transnational Ties***

Bangladeshis in the Netherlands maintain strong ties to Bangladesh and keep frequent contacts with family members and friends there. According to one of our informants “everyone has satellite television”. If they can afford it, most people go on holidays to Bangladesh every other year. In addition, practically all Bangladeshi migrants send remittances. Most Bangladeshis send remittances through informal channels which is riskier and illegal, and they are usually not aware of the facilities provided by the Bangladesh government. An informant tells us that in this sense there are two kinds of migrants: temporary and settled migrants. Temporary migrants send more remittances than migrants who settle down (see also Van Meeteren 2011). Temporary migrants do not have well-off backgrounds so what they do is save as much money as possible, and send almost 80% of their income to their family in Bangladesh.

However, most migrants in the Netherlands are settled. Netherlands is not an ideal country for temporary migrants. Temporary migrants can be found more in the UK or Italy as it is much easier to escape the police. The migrants who have settled down send fewer remittances because they feel they have to keep a standard of living in the Netherlands. They send money occasionally, like twice a year. Apart from these personal remittances, Bangladeshis also send philanthropic remittances.

Remittances stimulate further migration from Bangladesh. This is because new migrants may have some problems in the initial stage but after a while they all send money back, also the irregular migrants. They pay back the loan they have taken out with middle men. They make for example 1,600 euro and they send 1,000 euro home each month. In spite of all the restrictions, migration to Europe therefore seems very much worthwhile.

Everywhere in Europe, Bangladeshi migrants fight amongst each other over political issues. There are two important parties in Bangladesh: the government party and the opposition. And there is Jamaat-e-islami which has diminished over time. In the Netherlands people do not support this extremist party but the other two are very much present. They have their own committees here which are sponsored from Bangladesh. Leaders from Bangladesh come there to discuss at meetings.

In this sense Bangladeshis are very much engaged in political transnational activities. Bangladeshis of the different parties frequently clash over political issues. In addition, within the party that is in power there are different divisions and they clash as well. An informant says however that it is not as serious as in the UK or in the US. The second generation is not that interested in politics. Mostly the ones who came during the 80s and 90s engage in political transnational activities.

Most Bangladeshis in the Netherlands have family members in other European countries with whom they stay in touch and exchange information. They visit each other as well. They

keep each other up to date about possibilities in different countries. They check and double check all information before moving to another country. This means that in order to understand Bangladeshi migration to the Netherlands, we should not only look at the transnational ties between Bangladesh and the Netherlands but include transnational ties between Bangladeshis other European countries as well.

Bangladeshi migrants use all means available to come to Western Europe. They come through the Mediterranean Sea, Morocco, through Eastern Europe, Poland. It is easy to obtain a visa for eastern European countries. Embassy staff is also involved in issuing visa for money (Key informant, 2010). Human smugglers ask between 10.000 and 20.000 euro for a journey to Europe. The human smugglers guide them and tell them what to do, when to do it and who will receive them.

## 4.2. Brazil

The migration flow from Brazil to the Netherlands has rapidly expanded over the years. In figure 2, we see the growth of the first generation Brazilian population in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2012. It shows that the Brazilian population residing in the Netherlands has grown at full speed, from 3,933 immigrants in 1996 up to 11,929 in 2012.

When looking at the Brazilian population in the Netherlands, there is one statistic that is particularly striking: 68% of all Brazilians in the Netherlands is female and only 32% is male. Brazilian migration to the Netherlands is therefore female-dominated. This number probably resulted from the high number of marriages between Dutch citizens and Brazilian women that surpasses the number of Brazilian (male) labour migrants (Consulate Brazil 2009). It is important to note that there might be more people with Brazilian nationality in the Netherlands than is counted today. Of course there are irregular migrants who are difficult to monitor, but there is another group that might slip from the grasp of the statistical bureau. There is a number of Brazilians with double nationality. If they are born in Brazil, they will appear as such when countries of birth are analysed. When observing migrants according to nationalities they will probably not appear.


Many Brazilians with Spanish and Italian roots have relatively easy access to that particular nationality.

Having a grandparent of one of these origins might be enough to obtain the passport in question. When counting immigrants per nationality, this group will not be counted as Brazilians because European citizens have a different way of entering (and residing) in the EU. They are for example exempted for the demanding civic integration courses. The number of these Brazilians is hard to estimate but this group should not be neglected. There are 6,151 Brazilians with a Dutch nationality but the number of Brazilians with another EU nationality remains unknown.

Irregular migration is hard to grasp. 15% of all Brazilians in the Netherlands are irregular according to a key informant. He admits that this is a rather conservative guess. This would lead to a number of around 3.000 irregular Brazilians.

A key informant, who conducts research among mostly irregular Brazilian migrants in the Netherlands estimates that there are around 20.000 irregular Brazilian migrants in the Netherlands, most of them residing in Amsterdam. The actual number should lie between these estimates.





Source: Netherlands Statistics.

Figure 2. Number of first generation Brazilian immigrants in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2012.

#### ***4.2.1. History of Migration from Brazil and Migration Motives***

Not much is known about the first migrants who came from Brazil to the Netherlands. Statistics Netherlands counted 39 Brazilians in the Netherlands in 1930. However, who these people were is nowhere to be found. The next data available on Brazilian migration dates from 1972. In that year 139 Brazilians migrated to the Netherlands. In the previous years, there were probably Brazilian migrants settling in the Netherlands as well but there are no data available supporting this presumption. As motives for this early migration, a key informant mentioned fleeing persecution resulting from the military dictatorship and marital migration. Labour migration would only have started on a larger scale after the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s.

It might be important to note that the Netherlands is not a particularly popular destination for Brazilian migrants. Due to the language barrier and cultural differences, Brazilians are more likely to go elsewhere. The Netherlands could constitute a second best destination for Brazilian migration (Key informant, 2010). Most Brazilians wish to migrate to the UK but, especially after 9/11, it is harder to enter. Therefore, people ‘end up’ in the Netherlands (legally or illegally), or they attempt to make the transit later. Therefore, especially the pioneer migrants are likely to have ended up in the Netherlands after passing through other countries. It is less probable that they had chosen the Netherlands as their country of destination before leaving Brazil.

Motives of migration for the pioneer migrants of the 1960s and 1970s vary. According to our informants, these migrants were likely to have fled the military dictatorship in Brazil that lasted from 1964 to 1985. Other motives mentioned for these early migrants are work, family or study related. In the 1980s we observe a change in migration motives. The financial situation in Brazil worsened and by the end of 1982 the Brazilian government was ready to sign an agreement with the IMF (Diaz-Alejandro 1983:529). During the 1980s and 1990s,

facing a stagnating economy and successive economic crises, a mostly young population began to seek better economic opportunities elsewhere (Bógus 2007).

Nowadays, we see very clearly that family related migration (41%) dominates<sup>5</sup>. This probably largely constitutes Dutch-Brazilian marriages. Labour migration constitutes 37% followed by study related migration with 16%. 4% migrated for other reasons and 1% for an internship or as an au pair. Demands for asylum from Brazil can be neglected. Several informants mentioned that irregular migrants have a predominantly labour related motive which is obviously not visible in the official statistics. This means that in reality, labour migration probably takes up a larger share than statistics allow us to see.

#### ***4.2.2. Political and Economic Shifts***

Military dictatorship in Brazil lasted from 1964-1985 has led to an emigration of Brazilians to Europe and probably also the Netherlands. On economic crises and the aftermath of 9/11 Sandoval says: 'Today, the political, social and economic crises of the (South American) continent, combined with new control policies of visas of the United States after September 11, make Europe an attractive destination.' (Sandoval 2008: 6) 'In fact, since 2001 there has been an increase in the Latin American population in the Netherlands of 47%, compared to previous years' (Sandoval 2008: 9).

If we take British harshening migration policies into account we suppose that more Brazilian migrants come to the Netherlands than previous years (Key informant 2010). Logically thinking, these migrants would predominantly be irregular because Dutch immigration policies have also become much harsher recently. In general, border checks have tightened because many people overstay their tourist visas.

The economic crises of the late 1980s early 1990s also have functioned as a push factor for migration. During this period the economy stagnated and inflation was high. Many young migrants migrated for labour related reasons. In 1994, the (new) real was linked to the dollar which led to more economic stability. Due to this it was easier for Brazilians to travel abroad and this might as well have led to more migration from Brazil.

On the other hand, a stable currency might also diminish the need to migrate so this shift is rather ambiguous in its consequences.

Brazilian emigration policy does probably not influence migration from Brazil to the Netherlands. According to a key informant there is no particular emigration policy. However, Brazil did construct an instrument to have a dialogue between the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Brazilian community abroad, *Brasileiros no Mundo* (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2010).

Regarding the shifts in the Netherlands, there is one that stands out: the 2006 Civic Integration Abroad Act. The policy 'filters out' people who cannot afford to take the exam and people with less ability to learn. Regular migration from most countries, including Brazil, has probably declined due to this policy.

Also, the IOM offers a program for voluntary assisted return and reintegration for migrants. From January to October 2009, 263 Brazilians have left the Netherlands with this program, making Brazilians the second largest group to benefit from this policy (IOM NL 2009).

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<sup>5</sup> Data retrieved from Statistics Netherlands and concern 2009.

### **4.2.3. Transnational Activities**

There are several transnational links between Brazilians in the Netherlands and Brazil. Firstly, Orkut connects Brazilians all over the globe. Orkut is a social networking site like Facebook where one can join (discussion) groups. In April 2008, Orkut reached the number of 120 million users (Socialnetworks 2008) and 50,6% of its users is from Brazil (Orkut 2010). Oosterbaan (2010) acknowledged the importance of this network for Brazilian migrants. A large body of information regarding immigration, integration and all other aspects of migrant life can be found on Orkut and its communities. Apart from Orkut there are other websites of significant value for Brazilians in the Netherlands. *Brasileirosnaholanda.nl* contains everything related to the life of Brazilians in the Netherlands from the assisted return to Brazil by the IOM to Brazilian dance parties. One needs to log in to see all information. Orkut and '*brasileirosnaholanda.nl*' function as informal networks that connect people transnationally. People use it to prepare their migratory track and the importance for migrants should not be neglected.

Besides online communities, there are organisations that connect Brazilians in the Netherlands to Brazilians elsewhere. A good example is Casa Brasil Holanda, a cultural organisation that recently has broadened its activities. Nowadays they provide information and support in all kinds of fields for Brazilians, regardless of their legal status in the Netherlands. The board of Casa Brasil Holanda is in frequent contact with organisations, both NGOs and authorities, in Brazil and elsewhere. They are member of the 'Brasileiros no Mundo' network and of the 'Plataforma de Organizações Latino-Americanas' (Casa Brasil Holanda 2010).

Besides cultural organisations, there is a substantial number of Brazilian churches in the Netherlands. Most of them are based in Amsterdam and Rotterdam but we find also churches in Enschede, Eindhoven and elsewhere. Churches are mostly Pentecostal, Evangelical or Catholic. One example of a church community is *Comunidade Christã* which has churches in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Enschede. A church does not only have a religious function, people can also find work via those networks according to Oosterbaan (2010). Sometimes people even sell jobs. Cultural organisations and churches are of great importance for transnational contact and usually encompass more than the regular functions one would attribute to these organisations. Furthermore, Brazilians are united on a global and European scale. In Europe there is a Network for Brazilians in Europe (*Rede Brasileira na Europa*). This is a platform organized for the cooperation between associations, groups, collectivities, and partners of Brazilian migrants in Europe (*Rede Brasileira* 2010). It is a way for migrants to exercise power over the Brazilian government. Besides the 'Rede' there is also a previously mentioned global network called 'Brasileiros no Mundo'. In contrast to the European network, 'Brasileiros no Mundo' has been set up by the government.

Transnational activities of Brazilians and Brazilian organisations are numerous. It seems that the activities grow along the growth of the population and that existing organisations mature. This could have positive effects on migration. There seems to be a Brazilian infrastructure forming in the Netherlands. Together with the relatively high wages for irregular migrants this could have a pulling function for further migration.

It is possible to fly to Brazil from almost every large airport in Europe and Brazil has some airports with connections to Europe. Therefore, we see more migration from areas that have a good connection to Europe, and consequently the Netherlands. The possibilities to travel greatly influence migration flows to the Netherlands. From Surinam it is possible to

take several flights to in the Netherlands from the North East because of the direct travel opportunities. People also often leave from the region of Goiás. From Brasília there is a direct flight to Lisbon. From the southern region, many airlines offer possibilities to fly to Europe.

Because transnational contact via the Internet has expanded rapidly, this has opened new possibility of ‘meeting’ people abroad. It is not uncommon for Brazilian ladies to meet their future boyfriend or husband online and it happens more and more often because Internet has become more accessible. According to several Brazilian migrants, this happens regularly. Besides chatboxes, there are also enterprises specialised in Brazilian ‘mail order brides’. This phenomenon seems to be less developed and widespread than in Russia or Ukraine. However, a substantial number of women looking for men abroad can be found on different websites.

#### ***4.2.4. Where in Brazil Are They From?***

Interviews with several experts have given insight in where Brazilian migrants come from although it remains difficult to identify specific flows of migration between Brazil and the Netherlands. Interviewees mentioned different regions, but some were mentioned by everyone. Firstly, migrants come from the region of Pará, sometimes extended to Manaus in Amazonas. This is related to the proximity of Surinam. People leave from Amazonas and Pará, more specifically from the region around Manaus in Amazonas and the entirety of Pará. The route leads them via Belém and Paramaribo and Surinam to the Netherlands. This is by some informants linked to a questionable kind of migration. Drug traffickers, gold seekers and trafficked women said to come via this route (Hazeu 2008), probably amongst other migrants.

The second region where people are said to come from is the North East. A reason for migration nowadays could be the relatively easy journey to the Netherlands. The direct flight from Fortaleza facilitates migration from the North East of Brazil, the regions of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia. This area is very large when one considers all these regions, but migrants predominantly come from the coastal areas, what largely limits the area. A possible explanation for migration could be tourism from the Netherlands. There are many women who migrated after meeting their future husband in the touristic coastal area, for example in Natal or Fortaleza.

Thirdly, migrants come from the region of Goiás. These people not only migrate to the Netherlands, traditionally they go to the US or Spain. Many of these migrants are illegal. Strikingly, this is confirmed by every migrant or expert on Brazil. In the Netherlands, such a group is present as well although in smaller numbers than in the US or Spain. Naturally, not all irregular migration comes from this region, but a key informant mentions that there are human trafficking gangs operating in that area. However, it can certainly not be seen as a region that exclusively delivers irregular migrants to the Netherlands and the rest of Europe.

Lastly, the Southern region is not mentioned by all interviewees yet by several. This migration in the Netherlands is said to come from the South of Brazil (Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul). Traditionally these people leave because they have ancestors from southern and Eastern European countries.

#### ***4.2.5. The Brazilian Community in the Netherlands***

In May 2009, the Netherlands counted 22,196 legal Brazilians. 16,035 have only the Brazilian nationality and 6,161 have double nationality. This population is not evenly distributed throughout the Netherlands as most of them can be found in the larger cities.

Please note that these figures only encompass the legal migrants. Adding the irregular migrants, these numbers are expected to be significantly higher.

Most of the Brazilians can be found in the Western part of the Netherlands (9,964). Amsterdam is the home of 3,569 Brazilians while 1,449 live in Rotterdam. The Hague and Utrecht follow with 1,498 and 527 Brazilian inhabitants. The second group, comprising 2,799 people, lives in the east of the Netherlands. 498, 269 and 138 Brazilians live in Enschede, Arnhem and Apeldoorn respectively.

A key informant links the Brazilian presence in Enschede to human trafficking and prostitution. Because Enschede is a city on the Dutch/German borders, some Brazilian women were trafficked there to work in prostitution. This way, they could 'serve' two countries. The third group of Brazilians live in the southern provinces (Zeeland, Brabant and Limburg). The largest concentrations are to be found in Eindhoven (462), Tilburg (184) and Breda (181) (Consulate Brazil 2009). When the notion specific migration flows within corridors was discussed with informants, it turned out that there is a substantial number of Brazilians from the North East of Brazil in the Eastern part of the Netherlands, especially in Enschede. Regarding the number above, this could be a group of maximally 498 documented people. If we include the irregular migrants, the group could be larger, as police documents show that many Brazilians without papers are apprehended in the Twente region.

### **4.3. Egypt**

According to the official data there are 12,031 first generation Egyptians in the Netherlands. Figure 3 shows that the population of first generation Egyptians in the Netherlands has mildly grown over the last years.


According to these same data, there are another 9,342 second generation Egyptians who reside in the Netherlands. This means that there are 21,373 officially registered Egyptians in the Netherlands. This is confirmed by one of our informants who estimates that there are 20,000 to 25,000 Egyptians in the Netherlands, including irregular migrants.

However, estimations based on Egyptian embassies and ministries' records of cross-border flows and emigration permits indicate that the number of Egyptians in the Netherlands was around 40,000 after the turn of the century (CAMPAS 2001, as cited in Zohry and Harrel-Bond 2003: 36-37).

The Egyptian population of first generation migrants largely consists of men. In addition, they are relatively old: more than half of the population is over 40 years. The data indicate that Egyptian immigration to the Netherlands has remained relatively stable in recent years, and that each year a substantial number of Egyptians leaves the Netherlands as well.

#### ***4.3.1. Migration History and Migration Motives***

During the period of the British protectorate, Egyptian Copts enjoyed a preferential treatment in Egypt. They occupied good positions in civil service and trade. This changed when Abdel Nasser became the second president of independent Egypt in 1954 (Choenni 1997). As a result, many of the Coptic elite started to emigrate looking for opportunities outside Egypt.



Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Figure 3. Number of first generation Egyptian immigrants in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2012.

The First Coptic church abroad was consecrated in New Jersey in 1964. The first Copts in the Netherlands arrived at the end of the sixties (De Wit 2002a). But it was not until the seventies that Egyptians started to migrate to the Netherlands in significant numbers (Choenni 1997).

In the 1970s, policies in Egypt actively promoted emigration and due to increased tensions with the government large groups of Copts emigrated (De Wit 2002b). In addition, it became popular for Egyptian students and recent graduates (both Copts and Muslims) to temporarily work abroad during the summer holidays to make some money (Choenni 1997). According to an informant, in the Netherlands many of these students and former students worked in Israeli owned shawarma businesses (see also De Wit 2002a). Shortly before the students came, Israeli business men had introduced shawarma, an oriental snack that the Egyptian students knew from their own country. Their culinary knowledge made the students welcome employees for the Israeli shawarma businesses.

The snack turned out to be a big success on the Dutch market and Egyptian students had found themselves a niche. Egyptian students who had worked in other western European countries before, started to come to the Netherlands as well to perform this holiday labour (Choenni 1997). The car trade between the Netherlands and Egypt was also very lucrative at that time, but most Egyptians worked in shawarma (De Wit 2002a).

After having worked for a certain period most students returned to finish their studies and by word of mouth this type of holiday job became well known at Egyptian universities and raised the interest of other Egyptians to undertake the journey to the Netherlands (Choenni 1997). According to an informant, there was not enough work for graduated students in Egypt at that time, which made the shawarma business in the Netherlands a much welcomed alternative.

Some of these students noticed how lucrative a shawarma business could be and used the money they earned as employees to open up businesses themselves after their studies (De Wit

2002a). As the number of shawarma places grew, so did the job opportunities for Egyptian students and graduates. The Egyptians created their niche by working almost exclusively with fellow countrymen. They created an attractive career perspective for employees as they could open up their own business after they had earned enough money. This perspective became the main motivator for additional migration (Choenni 1997). The population of highly educated students and former students who came during the seventies has formed the basis of the Egyptian migration to the Netherlands.

During the eighties large groups of low skilled Egyptians migrated to the Netherlands (again, both Muslims and Copts) (De Wit 1997). These were mostly single male migrants who ended up as employees in the shawarma business as well (de Wit 2002a). Their choice for the Netherlands was accidental and dependent on the opportunities offered by migration brokers (De Wit 2002a). They lacked concrete information about the Netherlands but were drawn by what acquaintances, family members and friends who had been in the Netherlands told them. Arriving on a tourist visa, these migrants were informed by fellow countrymen about possibilities for work. This way, they ended up employed in the shawarma businesses (De Wit 2002a).

In the nineties, Egyptians had established hegemony in the shawarma niche. In 1993, three quarters of all businesses in Amsterdam were Egyptian owned, and 25% of all snackbars (including lunchrooms and cafeterias) were Egyptian owned (Choenni 1997). It is estimated that during the nineties, more than half of the Egyptians in the Netherlands worked as an entrepreneur or in a business owned by another Egyptian (Choenni 1997). According to an informant, by the end of the nineties, competition in the shawarma business had become fierce and the Dutch government increasingly exercised controls on illegal employment and tax evasion, which made it more difficult for Egyptian entrepreneurs to continue to make the huge profits they made during the seventies and eighties. Slowly, Egyptian entrepreneurship therefore started to spread to other sectors as well.

As it became more difficult for owners of shawarma businesses to employ illegal workers, the flow of migrants from Egypt started to decrease, an informant tells us. Especially for irregular migrants, the Netherlands ceased to be an attractive country because employers became increasingly more afraid to hire illegal employees. However, this informant further specifies that Copts kept arriving during the nineties because of tensions in Egypt.

A small minority of Egyptians in the Netherlands has applied for asylum. Between 1995 and 1999, 201 Egyptians asked for political asylum in the Netherlands (De Wit 2004). These are small numbers compared to regular residence requests.

In the period 1995-1998 only 46 Copts applied for asylum. All requests made by Egyptian Copts have been denied except for one (De Wit 2002a). Many Egyptians made false asylum applications. Some Muslims pretended to be Copts, and others claimed they belonged to some religious Muslim minority.

All in all, both Egyptian Copts as Muslims have predominantly migrated to the Netherlands for economic reasons (De Wit 2002a). For Copts, political motives do play an indirect role in fostering these economic motivations as these migrants point at their religious background for their lack of economic opportunity in Egypt (De Wit 2002a). However, according to an informant, the same is true for some Egyptian Muslims.

Most Egyptian Coptic migrants in the Netherlands have worked in Egypt but due to the low pay and lack of perspective they longed for a better life. Some said they wanted to see the world (De Wit 2002a). Although the Coptic community was initially mainly comprised of

men, nowadays family formation and reunification brings Coptic women from Egypt (De Wit 2002a). According to an informant, Muslim Egyptian migration started off as primarily male migration as well, but females have started to come as well.

As said before, the shawarma business had become less lucrative during the nineties. After 2000, the Turks also started with Döner, a snack that is similar to shawarma, thereby increasing the competition. Many Egyptians had kept large parts of their sales off the books, but this had become increasingly more difficult.

People used to have several illegal workers employed but as this became practically impossible, the shawarma business turned into hard work for little money instead of a lucrative business. In the last ten years, many Egyptians have therefore either left the shawarma business or went bankrupt.

Some Egyptians quit their business and looked for a regular job because this offered them more peace and quiet than a seven day work week in shawarma. Some still continue because they do not have the skills and the experience to do anything else. This is especially true for the older generation. They have not learned anything else. They also lack Dutch language skills. Other people went bankrupt and now receive welfare benefits. According to an informant, unemployment has become problem among Egyptians.

In addition, many Egyptians also worked for other people in the shawarma business. They do not have the skills or the legal status to do anything else. According to an informant, life has become very hard for this group, and some have returned to Egypt or tried their luck in another country. According to an informant, only people who own more upmarket restaurants or other type of businesses are still doing well. Small shawarma businesses make a living but they have to work seven days a week and do not earn much.

Nowadays, there is little new migration compared to the seventies and eighties. According to our informants you can tie the moment the migration started to become less to the more stringent policies. A few irregular migrants still come. These are usually former students who cannot find a job in Egypt and who are lured to the Netherlands in the prospect of finding a Dutch wife. In addition, Copts still come because of their situation in Egypt and because the church helps them to find illegal employment.

It has yet remained unclear what effects the Arab spring and the constitution of a government led by the Muslim Brotherhood will have for migration to the Netherlands.

Unlike Bangladeshis, who move to other countries to continue their business there, Egyptians do not move to other countries because of their age. They have children here and do not want to take the challenge to start all over. Some people have returned to Egypt.

According to an informant, the remigration arrangement makes it possible for people to return while they maintain benefits of 400 to 500 euro a month. But in order to get it people have to give back their Dutch passport. An informant says the Dutch government wants to lose unemployed Egyptians because they cost money and care. Some people have taken this arrangement. Most however, stay here even though they are unemployed because it is the most lucrative option.

#### ***4.3.2. Policy Changes in the Netherlands Affecting Egyptian Immigration***

In the Netherlands, several policy changes have made life for Egyptians in the Netherlands more complicated. Our informants speak of increased controls on illegal employment and tax evasion which have become so frequent that Egyptians can no longer hire illegal workers in their shawarma businesses, and that they can no longer keep revenues



off the books. Egyptians who had the skills to change to a regular job therefore did, while those who could not either went bankrupt or continued to struggle. Those who worked as employees and those who went bankrupt are now usually unemployed.

Furthermore, it has become more difficult to obtain a legal status. In the past, many marriages took place with Dutch women. Nowadays, if you want to marry as an irregular migrant you first have to go back to Egypt to make formal arrangements there. According to an informant, this is an obstacle for many irregular migrants. In addition, asylum requests are usually rejected so Egyptians have stopped trying and it has become more difficult to live as an irregular migrant because of the lack of employment possibilities. As a result, marriage is still the dominant and most successful legalisation strategy (cf. Van Meeteren et al. 2007; Van Meeteren et al. 2009).

#### ***4.3.3. The Egyptian Community in the Netherlands***

Egyptian migrants in the Netherlands originate from different places in Egypt but many people come from Cairo or other cities. This is because half the population in Egypt lives in urban areas. Egyptians in the Netherlands do not come from all over Egypt because the population in Egypt lives in specific areas. There are no regions or cities except for Cairo that really stand out. Egyptian Copts come from areas in Egypt where most Copts live. They therefore more frequently originate from the south of Egypt than Muslims do. According to an informant, Egyptians from small cities cluster together in the Netherlands but those from cities do not do that.

Exactly how many Egyptian immigrants in the Netherlands are Copts or Muslims is unknown as the Netherlands does not register the religion of newcomers. It is estimated that Copts make up around 30 per cent of the Egyptian community in the Netherlands (De Wit 2002a). This is more than two times their percentage in Egypt, where they are estimated to comprise between 6 and 10% of the Egyptian population (De Wit 2004). Two third of all Copts live in Amsterdam or The Hague (De Wit 2004). Choenni (1997) estimates that more than half of the Egyptians in Amsterdam are Copts. The number of Coptic churches worldwide lies around 180, of which 42 are to be found in the United States. The first Coptic church was opened in Amsterdam in 1985 (De Wit 2002a). In the Netherlands, there are currently 7 Coptic Orthodox churches. They are located in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, The Hague, Leeuwarden, Assen and Enschede. The church plays a central role in the lives of Coptic migrants.

Copts are in general somewhat better educated than Egyptian Muslims in the Netherlands (De Wit 2002a). According to an informant, Copts are also better off financially. He says that the Coptic community in Amsterdam is a rich community consisting of many wealthy entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the number of mixed marriages is high among Copts. It is estimated that half of the Coptic men are married to a Dutch woman. This is reflected in the masses in church, which are also held in Dutch three times a week (Choenni 1997).

Even though Egyptian Copts and Muslims in the Netherlands do not differ much in terms of their daily activities, they consider themselves to be very different (De Wit 1997). They consider themselves to be different ethnic groups and do not have much contact. Egyptian Muslims do work for Shawarma businesses owned by Copts but vice versa hardly occurs (Choenni 1997). In addition, a marriage between a Copt and a Muslim Egyptian is not approved of (De Wit 1997). Although Egyptian Muslims are also often entrepreneurs and they have the same migration-background, there are marked differences in the social lives

they lead. Mixed marriages are not as frequent among Egyptian Muslims, although they do occur (Choeni 1997). They have only one Egyptian mosque in Amsterdam and usually visit Moroccan mosques (De Wit 2002a). In contrast, Coptic life is very much connected to the Coptic church. As a result, Copts in the Netherlands seem to form a tighter community than Muslim Egyptians. According to our informants, there is definitely no sense of an 'Egyptian community' in the Netherlands. In Amsterdam, the church is much visited and all kinds of activities are organised. Newcomers are shown around and provided with information. After a church service, they enjoy a meal together and information is exchanged (Choeni 1997).

Although it has become more difficult for new migrants to find work in the Netherlands, Copts usually manage to find employment because the church acts as a mediator. When someone looks for a job, they first go to the church. Mosques do not do that. According to an informant, this has religious reasons but it is also because mosques already receive more negative attention in general. They are consequently afraid to get a bad reputation. Churches not only help irregular migrants find a job but they also provide beds to irregular migrants in need. Mosques also do not do that because they are afraid of their reputation. Contrastingly, churches even help irregular migrants financially, yet they only help the Coptic and not the Muslim Egyptians.

The population of highly educated former students who came during the seventies to work in the shawarma business has formed the basis of the Egyptian migration to the Netherlands. This has been largely male migration as it is difficult in Egyptian culture for women to migrate on their own. They have started families in the Netherlands. Many married Dutch women (see also Choenni 1997). Some broke up after a few years but most have stayed together. Their children do not enter the shawarma business anymore but pursue other careers by means of higher education.

#### ***4.3.4. Transnational Ties***

There are three ways in which social networks facilitate Coptic migration from Egypt to the Netherlands. First, clergy from the Coptic church partly form the networks. The Coptic church in Egypt stresses the positive aspects of migration such as the founding of new churches and renewed international contacts and influence, but promoting emigration is not the official policy (De Wit 2002b). They support Copts abroad by setting up churches and in some cases help arrange migration by providing information about the destination, by writing letters and by providing material aid (De Wit 2002a). Second, Coptic churches in the Netherlands not only have a religious function, but they have a strong social function as well. After the religious ceremony, migrants discuss possibilities for employment, legal statuses and other practical matters, and these information channels extend to Egypt (De Wit 2002a). Third, family formation and reunification are on the rise among Copts in the Netherlands as these are practically the only legal means to enter the country these days (De Wit 2002a).

Egyptian Muslims lack the religious clergy as a migration-stimulating category of people and have to rely on their personal networks. As they have not formed a tight community in the Netherlands, information is less well circulated and transferred to Egypt.

According to an informant, Copts in the Netherlands do not invest in Egypt because they do not feel safe there. Instead they invest in the Netherlands and have become a wealthy community. Muslims do invest in Egypt. They buy a house there if they can. They want to have independent accommodation when they are on holidays instead of staying with family. Going on holidays to Egypt is more complicated for Egyptians Copts. Copts do send many

remittances. In fact, they send more money than Muslims, because, due to their religious identity, their families are usually in a worse situation than Muslims. Both Coptic and Muslim Egyptians also send philanthropic remittances. They see this as a moral obligation.

Copts in the Netherlands, unlike in the US, are not politically organised (De Wit 1997). In the Netherlands, no Egyptian transnational political organisation exists. According to an informant, many Egyptians support basic human rights organisations but they are afraid to be active because they see Egypt as a police state and they do not want to endanger their family members in Egypt through their actions. Moreover, they feel they cannot change anything anyway. Nowadays, Egyptians usually come to the Netherlands by paying human smugglers large amounts of money to arrange visa and a small journey overland. More recently, Egyptians have also started to illegally cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat. Some stay in the Southern European countries where they arrive (mostly Italy) and others continue north.

#### 4.4. India


The Netherlands is, after the UK, the country with the second largest population of people of Indian descent in Europe. If we consider immigration from Indian born migrants in Figure 4 we see that the Indian population in the Netherlands has been relatively stable until 2004. The growth of 2004 is caused by the introduction of a new policy for highly skilled labour in that year. These people all have temporary residence permits and we cannot determine whether this trend will lead to a change in the general Indian population in the Netherlands.

However, these statistics do not provide the full picture. A distinction must be made between two historically formed groups from India. First, there is a group of people born in India who have migrated to the Netherlands. They are often called Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The data presented above concern this group. Second, the Netherlands hosts a group of people who have migrated from India to Surinam and afterwards to the Netherlands. They are called Hindustanis or, in Indian jargon, People of Indian Origin (PIOs). These people are descendants of the 34.000 British-Indian contract labourers who were brought to the former Dutch colony of Surinam between 1873 and 1917 to work on the plantations (Choenni and Adhin 2003:8). After 1917, when the flow of new migrants and their stories from the homeland stopped, they had to rely on their own cultural baggage (Choenni and Adhin 2003:14).

A substantial number of Indian migrants or their descendants have migrated to the Netherlands. In the official statistics they are registered as Surinamese. It is difficult to estimate the number of these people because not all migrants from Surinam are of Indian origin. The NRI and PIO groups are very distinct.

If we consider immigration from India to the Netherlands it is important to know this historical context. However, we will predominantly deal with the NRI migration from India to the Netherlands in this chapter, and elaborate on the Hindustani PIOs whenever relevant. The Hindustani population that has been in the Netherlands for several generations and should be considered as established.

Since the 1950s and 1960s, Hindustanis migrated from Surinam to the Netherlands and around 1973 a large wave came about (Choenni and Adhin 2003:11).



Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Figure 4. Number of first generation Indian immigrants in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2012.

Moreover, there is an Indian born population whose migration from India to the Netherlands started after India's independence and the Second World War, although there are no statistics available to confirm this. The first information on migration from Indian nationals to the Netherlands dates from 1976. In that year 339 Indians came to the Netherlands. This population is characterised by stability on a low level. The last group, the highly skilled or knowledge migrants have only started to come in 2004 when this new policy came into force (see section 3 for details). In 2004, immigration numbers (especially on labour migration) suddenly grew significantly while emigration rates also grew fast. Before that time, labour migrants would come to the Netherlands but not in the high numbers that we observe now. Since this trend started recently it is not possible to determine the development for the future. This migration flow should be considered a starting migration flow. In 2007, 3,558 Indians migrated to the Netherlands, of which 1,513 were so-called knowledge migrants.

While the number of immigrants from India to the Netherlands has grown rapidly over the last years, we also see a sharp increase in the emigration of Indian immigrants in the Netherlands. This is probably because highly skilled labour migrants tend to stay only temporarily. Often these people are very mobile and the knowledge migrants only obtain a residence permit for maximally 5 years.

There is much uncertainty about irregular migration from India. The Dutch Embassy in New Delhi mentions that irregular migrants are said to come from the regions of Punjab (north west) and Tamil Nadu (south east). Many irregular migrants from India leave from Tamil Nadu, some of them are Sri Lankan but stay in India before travelling further (UNODC 2009). This report does not discuss irregular Indian migration in the Netherlands but treats almost all other European countries. This could indicate that other countries constitute a more popular or easy destination for these migrants. The routes migrants follow differ. Some people are said to come via Eastern European countries but many others follow another track.

Today there are 16,500 first generation Indians in the Netherlands and the second generation comprises 6,920 people. The total official Indian population in the Netherlands is 23,420 people, adding the people in an irregular situation, this leads to 26,000 or up to 27,000 people. The number of Hindustanis is estimated at 130,000 to 160,000 people. The opinions differ on the exact size of the population because this group is not registered as such.

The Indian population in the Netherlands is male dominated in certain age categories. Later on we will elaborate on a special policy for high skilled labour migrants of which Indian people benefit the most. About 75 per cent of all immigrants who enter the Netherlands via this policy scheme are male (IND 2009). In 2007, 68.5% of all Indian immigrants were male versus 31.5% female (De Boom et al. 2009). Before the knowledge migration policy came into effect in 2004, Indian migration to the Netherlands was not dominated by men like it is these days. It therefore appears to be related to the migration of highly skilled workers.

#### ***4.4.1. History of Indian Immigration to the Netherland and Migration Motives***

The first Hindustani migrants from Surinam to the Netherlands came in the 1950s and 1960s. These people had to be fortunate because the costs for the passage by boat were very high. Besides them, some students and nurses came to the Netherlands. Not all students really migrated to study, some of them used it as a way to enter the Netherlands and just wanted to try their luck elsewhere (Choenni and Adhin 2003:55)

The first migrants from India to the Netherlands came after the Second World War. These migrants were predominantly highly educated and came for professional reasons. Often, they were scientists or students. It is unknown when the first Indian migrant settled in the Netherlands, someone is said to have arrived in 1958. A key informant mentions that for Hindustanis migrating from Surinam, the main motivation was the increased opportunity of higher education as compared to Surinam. Most authors mention economic and political reasons. Surinam used to be a colony of the Netherlands until 1975. The independence caused quite some political uncertainty and economic instability that encouraged migration to the Netherlands. All factors have had their influence. Migration from India to the Netherlands developed differently over time. Migration started after India gained its independence in 1947. Predominantly students and highly educated people left for the Netherlands. Today, most of the migrants from India are highly skilled and stay in the Netherlands temporarily. The number of asylum seekers from India is fairly low and declining (Statistics Netherlands 2010). Besides that, India used to be a popular country for adoption but also the number of adopted children from India is also on the decline (Statistics Netherlands 2010). Nowadays, we observe that all labour migration (including knowledge migration) is on a sharp rise while other kinds of migration have stayed relatively stable.

The development of migrants with other migration motives seems to be relatively stable. Students take up second place after labour migration (1,513 knowledge migrants). In 2007, 206 Indian students came to the Netherlands. In the same year 180 Indians migrated with family related motives. 34 people came with other reasons, 7 people for an internship and only 2 were asylum seekers. Students are said to often stay in the Netherlands after having finished their studies.

#### ***4.4.3. Policy Changes***

Two important policy changes have taken place, changing both Hindustani and Indian migration. Until November 1980, Surinam and the Netherlands had an agreement that

allowed people from Surinam to reside and settle in the Netherlands freely (Choenni 2003:55). In 1980, this would end and this could be an extra reason for the migratory wave around 1980 besides the political unrest and the economic stagnation (Lalla Rookh 1983:21). In 1983, the migration from Surinam to the Netherlands was bound by requirements. Surinamese people are now obliged to obtain a visa and it has become very difficult to settle in the Netherlands.

For India, a particular policy change had a positive effect on migration. In 2004, a special policy came into force for high skilled labour migration. The goal of this policy is to facilitate the procedure of immigration for these migrants, to make it faster, more clear and accessible for all actors concerned and to attract highly skilled labour migrants. Knowledge migrants are highly skilled people from outside the EU who have a contract with a Netherlands based company and earn a certain minimal salary. The knowledge migrants can obtain a residence permit for 5 years. Most people obtain a residence permit for 1 to 3 years (39%) or for 4 to 5 years (31%) (IND 2009: 20). From 2005 to 2008, the proportion of Indians who entered the Netherlands this way grew from 17% to 30% (of all knowledge migrants). Since men are mostly benefiting from this policy, male migration has relatively grown over the last few years. Knowledge migrants do not always come from India directly to the Netherlands. Sometimes they have worked in another country before. Therefore, numbers from India about these migrants might not encompass all of these migrants.

Hindustani migration from Surinam to the Netherlands could mainly be explained by the political instability that the country knew in the beginning of the 1970s. Migration had occurred since the 1950s and the 1960s but in the beginning of the 1970s a larger wave came about. In 1973, Arron became prime-minister and declared that Surinam would become independent in 1975. The Hindustanis were generally not in favour of independence, especially out of fear for Creole domination. From 1972 onward until after the independence, the political climate was unstable. This kept generating large flows of migration for Hindustanis to the Netherlands and brought about chain migration. More people had relatives in the Netherlands and Hindustani in Surinam wanted to follow (Choenni 2003: 16). In 1980, another migratory wave occurred. Economic stagnation and high inflation has led to this, together with more political issues. In 1980, a coup d'état was executed by Desi Bouterse and again this resulted in Hindustani migration. In 1983, it became much more difficult for Surinamese to settle in the Netherlands and to travel there (Lalla Rookh 1983: 21).

India has known an economic growth of more than 6% over the past 25 years (Kolhi 2007: 87). The country invests in education, especially in IT and scientific fields. The investments in this field can be observed in migration data. Highly qualified Indian IT-specialists are to be found all over the globe. It remains to be seen how migration will hold under the current economic crisis. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs forecasts are not positive in terms of migration and remittances (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2009: 4).

#### ***4.4.4. Transnational Activities***

When considering current migration from India to the Netherlands, the role of Indian companies is strikingly large. According to a representative Indian section of the Amsterdam municipality, about 100 Indian companies have settled in the Netherlands, 50 of these companies are to be found in and around Amsterdam. Especially these companies attract knowledge migrants. People do not arrange their trajectory to the Netherlands themselves. The companies, whose headquarters are often based in larger cities with universities such as

Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, chose the migrants and arrange their immigration affairs. Unlike in other types of migration, social networks do not seem to play any role in the migration of high skilled labour migrants.

For the knowledge migrants, a new association has emerged in 2009, the Indian Expat Society. Today, this organisation has over 5,000 members. On the website we read: 'We are here to serve the needs, represent the interests and address the concerns of the Indian expatriate community in the Netherlands. The IES is registered in the Netherlands as a foundation and its membership is open to all the Indian expats, professionals, businesspersons, and students alike'. The website is comparable to Facebook. One can connect to friends and join discussions. Unlike Facebook however, the Indian Expat Society frequently organises events like Bollywood movie nights, hockey competitions and celebrates Indian festivities. They try to facilitate integration in the Dutch society and in the Indian 'community' already present. Respondents mention contradictory issues on this subject. On the one hand the 'Indian community' would be a close knit community and everyone would know each other. This could hold for several individuals but certainly not for everyone. On the other hand, the expatriates and the 'other migrants' would live relatively separate from each other. Moreover, contacts would often occur between people from the same region which would imply a very scattered 'community'. A key informant illustrates this with the existence of different Yahoo groups of Indians in the Netherlands. There is a Tamil group, a group from Goa and from other cities of regions in India. These groups are mostly formed according to the place where the migrants originate from, illustrating the diversity of Indian migrants.

There is yet another division within the people of Indian origin. The Hindustanis and Indian 'communities' are rather separated from each other. One informant tries to emphasise how they do get along and how they can communicate in the same language. According to him there are many mixed marriages, friendship and contacts. He does acknowledge however that there are frictions between the two groups. Indians would see themselves as the 'owners' of Indian culture and Hindustanis would be too progressive and contaminated with South American culture. This leads to tensions between the groups. Lynnebakke describes that the relations between Surinamese Hindus and Indian Hindus are not very good (Saleh 2003). Some organizations attempt to change this situation. The Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) is active linking both NRIs and PIOs in the Netherlands to a global Indian network. According to their representative, they work together with other chapters of GOPIO, international businesses and other organisations and the Indian government while trying to unite PIOs and NRIs.


Another Indian-Dutch organisation, the Netherlands-India Association, has been founded in 1951. This is a cultural organisation. At that time not many Indian lived in the Netherlands and the members were predominantly Dutch but nowadays they also have Indian members. Their goal is firstly to promote knowledge and understanding of the culture, history, philosophy, religions and social structure of India and the Netherlands among the peoples of both the countries and secondly to advance and promote friendly relations between the peoples of India and the Netherlands by widening and strengthening personal, cultural and social contacts. (Netherlands-India Association 2010).

#### 4.4.5. *Where from and Where To?*

The roots of Hindustanis in the Netherlands (and in Surinam for that matter) lie in the regions of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India. Between 1873 and 1917, people were recruited from these regions to work on the fields in Surinam. There, they mainly lived in the Paramaribo and in the Nickerie region, both northern regions of Surinam. Hindustanis were concentrated here so Hindustani migration from Surinam to the Netherlands logically originated from these regions.

The sending regions of the current India-Netherlands migration are less easy to depict. Informants indicate that people are leaving from Punjab (this region also delivers a share of irregular migration). Haryana and Delhi are also mentioned in this respect. Besides that, Indian people in the Netherlands are said to come from the South, namely the regions of Goa, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu is also linked to irregular migration. Lastly, people come from the larger cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad and Cochin. Knowledge migrants do not seem to come from a certain area but from cities all over India. Logically derived these cities should have good universities and internationally operating companies.

Hindustanis had a different pattern of settlement than the Indians from India. Hindustanis are especially to be found in The Hague and Amsterdam. The Hague is said to host 25,000 Hindustanis. The pattern of settlement was predominantly caused by chain migration and the Dutch policy to spread Hindustanis over the country. When Hindustani migration started, people did not yet have family to settle nearby.



Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Figure 5. Number of first generation Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands between 1972 and 2011.

It was judged important to settle close to other Hindustanis. The Hague was seen as a quiet city, pleasant to live in and this caused more and more people to move there. The Dutch government did not approve of large concentrations of Hindustanis together and implemented a policy to spread people in 1974 and 1975. This policy and the chain migration that was



'directed' to the more peripheral regions of the Netherlands explain the presence of relatively large Hindustani populations in the North of the Netherlands. Hindustani are for example said to live in Leeuwarden. A group of Hindustani with roots in Nickerie in Surinam lives in Hogezaand-Sappemeer in the northern province of Groningen. Most Hindustani however, live in the larger cities like The Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam. Exact numbers are not known since the ethnic origin of Surinamese people is not registered.

Indians are spread throughout the Netherlands in a different manner. Most Indian born people live in Amsterdam (3,121), The Hague (1,619) and Rotterdam (1,092). Utrecht has 613 Indian born residents. Amstelveen (part of the Amsterdam agglomeration) and Eindhoven both have 939 Indian born residents. Amstelveen has relatively the greatest population of Indian born people. According to a key informant, Indian companies have settled in the area of Amsterdam, Hoofddorp, Amstelveen and the airport Schiphol. This would have led to the large concentration of Indians in that particular region. The Hague also constitutes a key location for Indian expatriates according to a key informant. Eindhoven is the town of the technical university and electronics corporation Philips. Many expatriates live in and around Eindhoven, including Indians. People especially live in and around cities where most companies are located.

## **4.5. Morocco**

The population of first generation Moroccans in the Netherlands seems stable at a level of a little above 160,000 for the last 10 years. Because massive migration from Morocco to the Netherlands started relatively early, the second generation currently outnumbers the first generation. In 2012, there were 362,954 Moroccans in the Netherlands, of whom 194,740 belong to the second generation. Because of the growth of the second generation of Moroccans, the size of the Moroccan population in the Netherlands remains relatively stable, in spite of despite of declining immigration rates. If we take a close look at the immigration numbers we see that from 1998 onwards, the number of Moroccans who migrate to the Netherlands has been declining. The number of irregular Moroccans in the Netherlands is hard to grasp. An estimate from 2002 ranges between 11,900 and 23,800 people (Hoogteijling 2002 in Van Praag 2006:6) Obdeijn estimates that the number of irregular Moroccan migrants is 10% of the official number (Obdeijn et al. 2002:216) which would give a population of about 16,000 people. According to an informant, there are less irregular migrants from Morocco in the Netherlands than before (cf. Van Meeteren et al. 2008; Van Meeteren 2010).

### ***4.5.1. History of Migration from Morocco and Migration Motives***

The first migrants who came to the Netherlands were labour migrants. Officially, the first Moroccan came to the Netherlands in 1961 and this number grew until 1973. The migrants' educational level was fairly low. 70% did not have any primary education. There is no real intellectual framework concerning the Moroccans in the Netherlands, unlike in France where the Moroccan migrant population is more varied (Obdeijn et al 2002: 211). Low skilled and often illiterate labour migrants were selected. Illiterate migrants were recruited because they would be less likely to join unions in the Netherlands. After pioneer migrants came to the Netherlands, this brought about chain migration. After a person left a family or village, others were likely to follow a comparable path (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 211). Besides migrants

from the Rif there was also a (much smaller) number of migrants from the cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Fes and Meknes. These migrants differed from the Rif migrants because they spoke Arabic. Their migration motives were labour related as well. The first Moroccan labour migrants who came to the Netherlands in 1961 did not come to the Netherlands directly but travelled through other European countries. In 1969 a treaty was signed by Morocco and the Netherlands to regulate the recruitment of labour migrants. Special agencies were set up to manage labour migration. Nowadays, it is clear that most labour migration did not occur through official channels. They were mostly helped by family members (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009: 1). These workers were so-called guest workers because it was believed that after working in the Netherlands for a certain time, they would return to their home country. Many guest workers stayed in the Netherlands and the foundations of a large Moroccan 'community' were laid. Until 1973 the number of Moroccan labour migrants in the Netherlands grew but the oil crisis changed the situation. In 1974 an immigration stop came into force. This did not stop migration; on the contrary, the large exodus of Moroccan migrants only started at that time (Obdeijn, De Mas, Hermans 2002: 216). Whereas beforehand migration had been labour-related, it now became family related. Regarding the average size of a Moroccan family, this meant that families of on average 5 or 6 persons could come to the Netherlands (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 211). Towards the end of the 70's and the beginning of the 80's many labour migrants decided to move their family to the Netherlands (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009: 2). Since the second half of the 80s, family formation has slowly but surely replaced family reunification. Due to this, the Moroccan 'community' in the Netherlands grew mainly because of births (Obdeijn et al. 2002:216). The past years, two thirds of Moroccan migrants motivated their migration by family formation whereas only one fourth had family unification as their motive (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009: 2).

#### ***4.5.2. Economic and Political Changes Affecting Moroccan Immigration to the Netherlands***

In the 1960s the Moroccan state openly encouraged migration from certain regions in Morocco. Most of these regions were Berber-speaking and mountainous or semi-desert (De Haas 2007:9). In 1971 and 1972, after two failed coups d'état against King Hassan II, Morocco entered into a period of increasing political instability and repression. Furthermore, Morocco suffered even more from the high oil prices and the global economic downturn than European countries. This combination of factors explains why many migrants decided to stay in Europe or leave Morocco (De Haas 2009:3). In the years that followed the Moroccan state tried to control its citizens abroad. Through a network of control and spying networks consisting of Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques and government-controlled migrant organisations such as the Fédération des Amicales des Marocains all across north-western Europe (Belguendouz 2006, Van Heelsum 2002 in De Haas 2007:17).

In 1989 the tendency changed from controlling migrants to 'courting' the Moroccan diaspora. Instead of discouraging naturalisation of its nationals abroad double citizenship was now encouraged. Besides that, integration in the receiving society is no longer seen as endangering the link with Morocco. Integration is now seen as favouring the sending of remittances and investment. Lastly, migrants are no longer seen as a political threat but more as a political tool (De Haas 2007:22). 'Opération Transit' is an example that illustrates the changed attitude towards migrants. This operation facilitates the summer holidays of Moroccan migrants and their descendants to Morocco. In 1995 migrants have been allowed to

open foreign exchange banking accounts with Moroccan banks (Fellat 1996:316 in De Haas 2007:29). This facilitated migrants in sending their remittances to Morocco.

In 2000 the Aliens Act came into force regulating migration for family related reasons. The person wishing to reunite (and form) a family needed to have a stable income 120% of the minimum wage. In 2010 this was conflicting with the European rights concerning family reunion. Hereafter, the demand of the 120% minimum wage was cancelled but replaced with a 21 year age limit to be able to form or reunite a family from abroad (Europa Decentraal 2010). Lastly, the immigration and integration policies called inburgering largely influenced immigration and requirements to obtain tourist visa are nowadays very difficult to meet because of a strong suspicion for irregular migration.

#### ***4.5.3. The Moroccan Community in the Netherlands***

Most Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands are originally from the Rif Mountains in the North. Dutch recruitment agencies were directed towards this region where the population density was high in comparison to the available agricultural resources (Obdeijn et al. 2002:214). Besides that, this region was also known for its political turmoil (Obdeijn et al. 2002:211), so emigration from this region was advantageous for the Moroccan government at the time. 70% of Dutch Moroccans descents are from this region (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 214) and some even mention a larger percentage (Cottaar, Bouras and Laouikili 2009: 33). 55% of the first generation Moroccans now living in the Netherlands was born in the provinces of Al Hoceima, Taourit and Nador (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009:2).

Besides the Rif Mountains, Moroccans in the Netherlands originate also, although to a lesser extent, from the Souss valley in the South. Ouarzazate is specifically mentioned as a sending province. Around 10% of the Dutch Moroccans is said to come from the Souss region. These migrants are called Soussi (De Mas and Haffmans 1985 in Van Heelsum 2001: 1) and they speak a Berber language as well. Lastly, there is a group of migrants from the larger cities of central Morocco like Casablanca, Rabat, Fes and Meknes. They are relatively high educated and they constitute a minority among Moroccans in the Netherlands. They settled relatively early after migration from Morocco to the Netherlands started (Van Heelsum 2001: 1). They speak Arabic.

Moroccans in the Netherlands are very spread out throughout the country. They are to be found in almost every municipality and the largest 'communities' live in the 4 large cities; Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and the Hague. Amsterdam has 34,177 first generation Moroccans registered, Rotterdam 18,672, The Hague 13,357 and Utrecht 13,284 in June 2010. If we also take the second generation into account these numbers will be 68,077, 38,160, 26,249, and 26,431 for these four cities respectively.

Migration flows can be identified from particular regions or cities in Morocco to specific regions or cities in the Netherlands. One interviewee for example mentioned that all migrated Moroccans from his village (Tazourakht) now live in the area Roosendaal, Bergen op Zoom, Rotterdam (North), and Oudenbosch. In the last village 20 to 25 families from Tazourakht reside. Besides this specific example we could also identify more general migration flows.

Fokkema and Harmsen researched this phenomenon in a more systematic manner, looking at the places of birth of Moroccan migrants. There are three provinces in the North of Morocco from which most Moroccans in the Netherlands originate. 55% of all first generation Moroccans was born in Nador, Al Hoceima or Tetouan. Still most Moroccans migrating to the Netherlands come from these provinces. (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009:2).

Taza and Ouarzazate are other provinces that send many migrants. In Utrecht, 50% of all first generation Moroccans have their roots in Nador. People from Al Hoceima tend to migrate to The Hague, where 23% of the Moroccan population has roots in Al Hoceima. Of the people migrating from Tetouan and Ouarzazate, 40% and 47,7% respectively have moved to Amsterdam. In 2009, 15,5% of the Amsterdam Moroccans originate from Tetouan and 8% from Ouarzazate. In smaller cities and in villages this phenomenon is even more clearly visible.

Moroccans generally prefer to live amongst fellow nationals. Fokkema and Harmsen show in their research how the tightness of the Moroccan 'community' is bound to provinces. The pioneers who settled in a certain region provided help not only for family and friends but also for people from the same village and region. This brought about chain migration that resulted in the fact that Moroccan migrants per municipality often originate from one or a few provinces in Morocco (Fokkema and Harmsen 2009: 4).

#### ***4.5.4. Transnational Ties between Morocco and the Netherlands***

Since there are a large number of Moroccans and people of Moroccan descent present in the Netherlands, there is also a rather large number of associations and foundations for and by Moroccans. Van Heelsum provides an overview of all organisations (2001). The focus of these organisations on life in the Netherlands could be an indication for the degree of settlement of Moroccans here.

Many businesses have been established to provide services to Moroccan migrants and their descendants. The industry of companies focussing on means of communication and travelling for Moroccans is well developed. People also tend to use Skype. Many people also go to a 'belhuis', a shop where one goes to call abroad. Rotterdam and Amsterdam have many of these establishments run by and for Moroccans (Gemeente Rotterdam 2005; Gemeente Amsterdam 2003).

The airline industry also serves the migrant population. Travelling to Morocco has become cheaper than before. An informant explains that nowadays, people tend to take planes throughout the year instead of driving to Morocco during the summer holidays. Examples of airlines flying to Morocco are Elite, Amsterdam Airlines and Royal Air Maroc but there are many more. Many companies have direct flights to cities in the North of Morocco. There are also companies that only sell plane tickets for destinations in Morocco; they function as a link between the traveller and the airline. Besides companies that deliver communication and transport services to Moroccans in the Netherlands, there are also many other businesses like Halal butchers and grocery stores. The wide array of transportation and communication possibilities encourages and allows for more transnational activities.

Remittances and investments of Moroccans abroad also constitute a transnational activity. In 2003, Morocco was the 4<sup>th</sup> largest remittance receiver in the world receiving \$3,6 billion (De Haas 2005). Exact numbers about the amount of remittances are unknown but in 2002 migrants from different European countries among which the Netherlands, remitted on average €1000 per year. This includes children and the inactive population so the amount will be higher per remitting migrant. Remittances in kind (or via informal channels) are harder to monitor but estimates range from 25 to 50% of money transfers (De Haas 2009: 1). It is estimated that in 2004 an amount of 93-124 million euros was remitted from the Netherlands to Morocco. This number, a best guess, is based on information from both the sending and the receiving end (Barendse et al 2006: 34). Remittances are often cash carried or sent by money

transfer organisations. ‘The Moroccan government has adopted a positive attitude toward the integration of Moroccans abroad, which is now seen as an instrument for attracting remittances’ (De Haas and Plug 2006: 610). Remittances constitute by far the largest investments in Morocco, compared to official development assistance and foreign direct investments (De Haas and Plug 2006: 611). The volume of remittances sent to Morocco is on the rise and a moderate growth is expected in the future (Barendse et al. 2006:38).

To conclude, migration networks used to function on the basis of work and family. Dutch companies would need more workers and the workers present would ask a family member. Brothers, nephews, uncles travelled to the Netherlands to find work and they were helped by family members or friends who already lived in the Netherlands. After the stop on labour immigration, family related reasons were almost the only possibility to enter and reside in the Netherlands legally. Moroccans in the Netherlands would usually marry a partner from the same region in Morocco (Esveldt, Kuli-Glasgow, Schoorl and van Solinge 1995).

Family and friendship relations were very important in this respect. The functioning of networks like these has formed the Moroccan ‘community’ in the Netherlands into what it is today. An industry focuses on Dutch Moroccans and their descendants and the Moroccan organisations often focus on life in the Netherlands. This shows how the population has matured.

#### **4.6. Ukraine**


Migration from Ukraine to the Netherlands seems to be only starting off. In 1996, 21 Ukrainian migrants were registered in the Netherlands. This number grew to 855 in 2012. Yearly, twenty to a hundred Ukrainian migrants add up to this number. The total number of first generation Ukrainians in the Netherlands is slowly increasing, as is shown in figure 6.

Next to this registered number of first generation Ukrainian migrants, there is a substantial number of irregular Ukrainian migrants residing in the Netherlands. In addition, there is the second generation.

However, with only one second generation Ukrainian migrants registered in 2012, it becomes clear that statistics on Ukrainians in the Netherlands should be approached with caution.

Retrieving statistical data on immigration from Ukraine to the Netherlands is problematic. In the first place, statistics on the Ukrainian diaspora in the Netherlands do not include irregular migrants. Including irregular migrants, the total Ukrainian diaspora in the Netherlands has been estimated at 5,000 in april 2004 (Ukrainian Embassy in the Netherlands; Shakhno and Pool 2005). This number makes a striking difference compared to the official statistic (378 in 2004 registered by Netherlands Statistics).

Partly, this concerns irregular migrants and the other part can be explained by the second problem concerning data on Ukrainian migration to the Netherlands. The second statistical problem lies in Ukraine’s recent independency dating from 1991. The numbers registered by Statistics Netherlands only represent migrants who were born in Ukraine. Migrants who were born before Ukraine existed as an independent state, are registered as citizens of the ‘former Soviet Union’. Therefore, the statistics underestimate the total number of migrants of Ukrainian origin in the Netherlands.



Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Figure 6. Number of first generation Ukrainian immigrants in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2012.

Netherlands Statistics recognizes this ambiguity and has tried to divide migrants from the former Soviet Union countries according to what would be their current country of origin (Chkalova et al. 2008). This could be done by looking at their place of birth. In 2005, 35,060 first generation migrants were registered with ‘former Soviet Union’ as their home country. After the classification, the total number of Ukrainian migrants registered as coming from the former Soviet Union was approximately 5,600 in 2005.

#### ***4.6.1. Migration History and Motives of Ukrainian Immigrants***

The Netherlands has never been a traditional centre of Ukrainian settlement. Studies indicate that the earliest migration from the region we would now call Ukraine to the Netherlands took place in the 17<sup>th</sup> century when young Ukrainians came to study at Dutch institutions of higher education (Kohut 1994). During the Russian civil war after the Russian revolution of 1917, probably a few hundred wealthy Ukrainians ended up in The Netherlands. The Ukrainian S.S.R. in the 20s and 30s suffered from famine. As a result, some Ukrainians migrated to the Netherlands. Amongst them, there were several political refugees who had openly pursued Ukrainian independence and were persecuted by the Stalinist regime. The exact number of Ukrainians who migrated before the Second World War remains unclear because they were registered as Russians (Key informant2010).

During the Second World War, Dutch men were employed in Germany: this was called ‘Arbeitseinsatz’. Also, young women from the conquered areas of the Soviet Republic were employed in Germany. A large share of those women came from the Ukrainian S.S.R. as this region was the first to be conquered by the advancing German armies. Although contact between people of the Slavic and Germanic race was prohibited, approximately 4000 Dutch men brought back Russian/Ukrainian brides to the Netherlands after the war. It is not clear how many of them were Ukrainian, because they were all registered as originating from the Soviet Union (Kalinka 2004).

A subsequent flow of migration from the Ukrainian S.S.R. took place when ‘perestroika’ was instigated in 1985. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 allowed complete Ukrainian families

to migrate to the Netherlands based on humanitarian basis. Besides this event, some Jewish Ukrainians applied for asylum in the Netherlands because they were severely discriminated in Ukraine. Other Ukrainians strategically used discrimination as a reason to apply for asylum in the Netherlands. They have tracked back their Jewish roots in order to obtain a refugee status. A few thousand Ukrainians came to the Netherlands in the period from 1985 to 1991. They were also registered as coming from the Soviet Union (Key informant 2010). When the Soviet Union dissolved, it was no longer possible for Ukrainians to come to the Netherlands on the basis of a refugee status. Since then, migration of complete Ukrainian families to the Netherlands no longer took place.

The most important turning point is Ukraine gaining independence in 1991. Since then, Ukraine has struggled with an arduous transformation towards a parliamentary democracy and market economy (Cipko 2006). Ukraine experienced major recession during the 1990s when the Ukrainian government started economic reforms towards privatization. From 2000 on, the country's GDP started to grow for several years, but its economy was greatly affected by the crisis of 2008. The unemployment rate increased and the socioeconomic situation of many Ukrainian households worsened (CIA2010). This context became an incentive for migration towards countries among which the Netherlands at the end of the 1990s. It is hard to obtain a work permit to come to the EU, but many Ukrainian women looked for a better future with a partner abroad.

After 1991, the importance of family formation and –reunification as a motive has been growing and asylum as a motive has been declining (Chkalova et al. 2008). Currently, the largest group of Ukrainians who migrate to the Netherlands concerns women. They come to the Netherlands to live with their Dutch partners (Chkalova et al. 2008; Statistics Netherlands 2010) This group consists of a few thousand migrants so far (Key informant 2010). Ukrainian women tend to seek foreign (mainly Western) partners as a result of the Ukrainian history and the gender relations that stems from this history. Due to the Second World War, a quantitative women surplus arose in Ukraine. Competition amongst Ukrainian women to find a partner grew. Slavic men became lax, and continued to be in subsequent periods. Foreign men became attractive for Ukrainian women which led to emigration.

After 1985 when migration became possible and Ukraine was a poor country, an increasing amount of Ukrainian women looked for partners abroad. Most of the women who seek Western partners come from larger Ukrainian cities where internet is available. The internet – that over the last decade became accessible for a growing number of people - facilitated contacts abroad. Most Ukrainian women do not specifically aim for a Dutch partner. This is in contrast with homosexuals who aim for Dutch partners because they are aware of the Dutch tolerance towards homosexuals.

Next to this type of migration, migration motives are labour and education. Due to the restrictive Dutch immigration policy, it is hard for Ukrainian labour migrants to obtain a work permit (Shakhno and Pool 2005). Therefore, most Ukrainian labour migrants work temporarily and illegally (Shakhno and Pool 2005). They participate in agricultural work, construction, small-scale production and in the harbour. Sometimes they participate in illegal activities such as hemp farms (Katchour 2008).

Other political shifts occurred in 2001 and 2002 with the regularization of irregular immigrant workers in respectively Portugal and Italy. This offered Ukrainian migrant workers a real alternative to an illegal stay in other EU countries (Baganha et al. 2004; Kramer 2008). In the same year, the Netherlands introduced more strict immigration- and integration

policies. Due to this shift, migration towards the Netherlands in general declined, it can be expected that this applies for migration from Ukraine as well. Also, police checks on illegal labour migrants intensified. As a result of those political changes, most Ukrainian labour migrants choose to migrate to Southern European countries (Kramer 2008).

Lastly, several cases of human trafficking of Ukrainian women are known. A small number of them are expected to have ended up in The Netherlands, for example in prostitution (Hughes and Denisova 2001). Most migrants originating from the Western Republics are between 20 and 30 years of age (Chkalova et al. 2008). These numbers confirm that migration mostly concerns individuals or partners instead of families with children.

When Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, emigration to countries outside the Soviet Union was strictly limited (Malynovska 2006; Cipko 2006). When perestrojka was instigated in 1985, emigration became sparsely possible. After Ukraine became independent, emigration policy has been of laissez-faire nature (Shamshur and Malynovska 1994). Factors impeding migration from Ukraine to the Netherlands are related to the Schengen agreement.

Reality is that only a few Ukrainian migrants use this visa-procedure to come to the Netherlands. The largest share of the current (legal) Ukrainian immigrants come to the Netherlands on the motive of family formation. In order to get a residence permit, both partners have to meet several terms and pass a procedure. For Ukrainian labour migrants it is hard to obtain a work permit in the Netherlands via the legal procedure. As a result, most of their labour migrants reside in the Netherlands illegally. A case in point is a special agreement Ukrainian labour migrants use to work in the Schengen area. After Poland joined the European a special labour agreement between Ukraine and Poland remained in order. This made it possible for Ukrainian workers to work in Poland for a maximum of three months every half-year without needing a work permit (Van Heeckeren 2008). Some of these workers make use of the open borders and come to work in other Schengen countries as the Netherlands. There are some reports on a few hundred Ukrainian labour migrants in the Westland region, where they participate in agricultural labour and the Rotterdam harbour (Key informant 2010). Although these migrants do not have a legal status, this special visa protects them from being prosecuted or banished as a result of police checks.

#### ***4.6.2. The Ukrainian Community in the Netherlands***

There is no tightly knit Ukrainian community in the Netherlands (Kohut 1994; Key informant 2010). As explained in the previous sections, different flows of migration to the Netherlands can be distinguished. The oldest living first generation Ukrainians in the Netherlands are the women who migrated to the Netherlands just after the Second World War to marry Dutch partners.

In the post-war years, rumour had it that Stalin would reprise the 'Ostarbeiterinnen' for patricide. He started a repatriation mission to force the women to return to the Soviet Union (Key informant 2010). Because they feared to be forced to come back to Ukraine, the women were afraid to get in touch with their Ukrainian family members and friends, let alone visiting them. In the Netherlands they had to adjust to the Dutch culture. In the first years after the war, the women were lacking strong transnational ties with Ukrainians in their homeland or in other countries and were usually fully assimilated in Dutch society (Kohut 1994). In the period of 1945-1951 only 35 Soviet citizens returned to the Soviet Union, among which 24 women (Kalinka 2004).



In 1953, Chroestjov became leader of the Soviet Union. He proclaimed amnesty to all Soviet citizens who had worked in German labour camps. In 1955, Chroestjov set up a committee to urge those Soviet citizens to return to their home country. Only 41 Ukrainian-Dutch families returned in the period from 1955 until 1958. For many of them it was hard to settle down and they returned to the Netherlands (Kalinka 2004). From the 1960s on, visiting the Soviet Union became possible as well as mail and telephone contact.

Despite all those setbacks, many Russian/Ukrainian women in the Netherlands gathered in Russian/Ukrainian dance and music groups. This way they could support each other and cherish their culture. Also some previous migrants who came to the Netherlands during the first World War and the Russian revolution joined. Russian/Ukrainian folklore groups existed in Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam and Groningen. Besides those groups, the Ukrainian women were welcomed in the Russian orthodox church that has existed in the Netherlands since 1763 (Kalinka 2004).

A number of recent migrants who came to the Netherlands after 1985 have joined the existing Russian/Ukrainian folklore groups and churches as well. Geographical and generational differences are partly overcome amongst Russian/Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands. Through new flows of migrants and second generation Russians/Ukrainians, these organizations are kept alive. The two largest folklore groups in the Netherlands are Kalinka in Rotterdam and Roesalka in the region of Twente. There are Russian orthodox churches in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and other large Dutch cities.

It is difficult to draw a map of Ukrainian migration towards the Netherlands because the largest share of migrants who came to the Netherlands over the last decades, did not specifically aim or plan to come to the Netherlands. Ukrainian women who met their Dutch partners in Germany during the Second World War, originated from different regions in Ukraine. In the Netherlands, most of them ended up in the Randstad region: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Breda. This is because most Dutch men who worked in Germany were recruited in those larger cities.

A second group of Ukrainians who ended up in the Netherlands in that period were Ukrainian prisoners of war who fled for the Stalinist regime after the Second World War. A large number of them were employed in the textile industry in Twente: in the municipalities of Enschede and Hengelo (Key informant 2010). Women who migrated to the Netherlands after 1991 on the motive of family formation, mostly originate from larger Ukrainian cities. To meet a Western partner, they need to have internet access, speak some English and come in contact with mediation offices. In the Netherlands they usually settle where their Dutch partner lives.

The literature suggests that most Ukrainian labour migrants in Western Europe come from Western parts of Ukraine. The main reason for this is regional differences in Ukraine, with in Western Ukraine a higher level of unemployment, lower salaries and closer links with European countries (Kramer 2008; Shakhno and Pool 2005). In the Netherlands they settle in areas where work is available such as the Westland region and the Rotterdam harbour area.

Overall, the geographical dispersal of migrants from Ukraine over the Netherlands differs for different flows of migration. Currently, most Ukrainian men settle in the Randstad and large cities, while women are more spread across the country.

#### ***4.6.3. Transnational Ties between Ukraine and the Netherlands***

First generation Ukrainians in the Netherlands have ties with their home country. They are aware of political and economic developments, sometimes use their right to vote in Ukraine and still consider themselves Ukrainian. Most of the ties with their country of origin involve family members and friends. They have contact by mail, email and telephone and try to visit Ukraine on a regular basis (Key informant 2010).

Most Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands also feel an obligation to support their families in Ukraine financially. This is most strongly felt by Ukrainian women who left older children who study or work in Ukraine. Next to this, the pension system in Ukraine is poorly developed and there are not many elderly homes. Children have an official obligation to take care of their parents when they become needy (Key informant 2010). This is why many Ukrainians in the Netherlands send back money to their families.

Money transfer services as Western Union are not used often. Most Ukrainian migrants open a bank account for this purpose and send a debit card to their relatives. This is a cheaper and safer way. Another way to send money and gifts to Ukrainian relatives is by courier. These are Ukrainian migrants with a residence permit who can travel back and forth (Katchour 2008). Also, Ukrainians give their relatives gifts when they visit Ukraine. Sometimes they pay their family members to visit the Netherlands. How much money is sent back to relatives, differs between Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands. The total amount of remittances sent from the Netherlands to Ukraine remains unclear. Only estimates on the total amount of remittances received in Ukraine are available.

There are some reports of business taking place by Ukrainian migrants between the Netherlands and their home country. There is some import/export and outsourcing of ICT services to Ukraine. An example of business by migrants is 'Oost West Handel', a Russian/Ukrainian/Dutch company that offers consultancy services for Western business in Russia and Ukraine ([www.oostwesthandel.nl](http://www.oostwesthandel.nl)).

For Ukrainian women who seek a Western partner or vice versa, several mediation offices and websites exist. For example, there are [www.agency-exclusive.com](http://www.agency-exclusive.com) and [www.crimeanpearls.com](http://www.crimeanpearls.com). They are websites from Ukrainian mediation offices that include Dutch pages to match Ukrainian women to Dutch men. The Ukrainian agency that exploits the websites, offers information about Ukraine, translation of letters, a gift service, Dutch language courses and advice concerning the Dutch immigration procedure. The agency also organizes trips on which Dutch men are introduced to several Ukrainian women in person. As our key informant confirms, not all of those organizations are trustworthy.

#### ***4.6.4. Irregular Migration***

In practice it is difficult for Ukrainian citizens to obtain a visa in the Netherlands: they are seen as potential irregular migrants, unless proven otherwise. For example, Ukrainians who apply for a tourist visa are required to provide documents that prove that they will not stay in the Netherlands for work, such as a letter from their employer stating their current salary, a bank account statement and information about having a spouse and children (Shakhno and Pool 2005).

Many Ukrainians applied to other Schengen embassies than the Dutch one as rumour goes along that it is harder to obtain a visa in the Netherlands. If one's request is denied in one of the Schengen countries, it is harder to obtain a visa in one of the other Schengen countries afterwards. In 2002 the Dutch Embassy in Ukraine stopped cooperating with tour

agencies. Now those kinds of mediators have raised their prices for organizing visa and some of them have widened their service with smuggling people abroad. In Austria and Greece for example, lively forgery circuits exist (Key informant 2010). Often, Germany is the first country of entry and the majority of tour agencies organize tours and visa for Germany (Shakhno and Pool 2005).

As a result of restrictive policy, the legal opportunities for Ukrainians to live and work in the Netherlands are limited. Also with the intensified monitoring of illegal employment in the Netherlands during the last few years, it became more difficult for irregular workers to find jobs, and nowadays they often have jobs for a shorter period than they used to have before. Also, new arriving labour migrants sometimes need to 'buy' their first job from an earlier migrant (Kramer, 2008). Nonetheless, many Ukrainians still try to gain a better future as *zaboritsjani* (labour migrants).

In the south of the EU (Italy, Portugal and Spain) there are better opportunities for legalization of the residence and work status. Numbers show that this prospective attracts large numbers of Ukrainian migrants. Despite this circumstance, Ukrainian workers keep coming to the Netherlands because of the higher salaries. They mostly settle in places with high demand for manual labour.

Except for labour migrants, there is also a group of female irregular Ukrainian migrants. They came to the Netherlands on the motive of family formation but split up before they achieved a permanent residence permit. Some of those women did not return to Ukraine, but chose to stay in the Netherlands with an illegal status.

The easiest way for Ukrainian irregular migrants to regularize in the Netherlands is (still) to marry a Dutch or other EU-citizen. In November 2004 though, this possibility was limited by aggravated requirements for family formation (Shakhno and Pool 2005).

Most of the Ukrainian migrants who came to the Netherlands on the motive of family formation tell us they ended up here by chance. For example they came to the Netherlands to visit family members or on a holiday trip. They did not intend to find a Dutch partner. Afterwards they stay in touch by telephone- and internet contact and after a few visits back and forth they agree for the Ukrainian partner to migrate to the Netherlands.

Police data on apprehensions of irregular migrants in the Netherlands show that in the period from 1997 up till 2003, 2,077 irregular Ukrainians were apprehended. This number includes some people who were apprehended multiple times over that period. Most of them were apprehended in the Randstad and were between 20 and 30 years of age. This is in line with general data on Ukrainian immigrants (Chkalova et al. 2008) and the information we found on irregular labour migrants and women who had split up with their Dutch partners.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have shown how the history of immigration and immigration policies in the Netherlands has evolved. We indicated that the Netherlands has long been a country of emigration, only to become a country of immigration in the 1960s, when many labour migrants from the Mediterranean area arrived. This wave of guest workers was followed by migrants who came for purposes of family reunification, migrants from Surinam who came

after the former colony's independence, asylum seekers in the 1990s, and, more recently, migrants from new European member states as well as highly skilled migrants.

Furthermore, we have discussed the major policy developments of the last decades in seven policy domains of immigration: asylum migration, labour migration (including highly skilled), family migration, illegal migration, return migration, integration, and citizenship. This discussion made clear that the Netherlands has been a reluctant country of immigration for decades. Although the Netherlands has had a positive migration surplus since the early 1960s, successive governments denied that the Netherlands was a country of immigration. Not until 1998 the Dutch government officially acknowledged that the Netherlands had become an immigration country and that policies were needed. Migration and integration policies in the Netherlands have changed severely over the past forty years. Particularly after the 2002 elections, which were marked by the rise and death of Pim Fortuyn, integration policies focused more on assimilation, while immigration policies became increasingly selective.

The country case studies presented in this paper demonstrate the diversity of migration flows to the Netherlands. They also show that some migration flows are or have been much larger than appears in official statistics. Many contemporary migrations flows from Ukraine, Brazil, Egypt and Bangladesh are unauthorized due to restrictive and selective migration policies. As a consequence, official data are lacking, and expert opinions sometimes deviate to large extents. Nevertheless, by combining official statistics, literature reviews and expert interviews we have been able to provide a good outline of the immigration histories of the six selected countries.

Bangladesh proved to be an interesting case of a stagnating migration flow to the Netherlands. Bangladeshi migration to the Netherlands has never really taken off, probably because conditions in the Netherlands were less favourable than in other European countries. Through their transnational social networks, Bangladeshis actively exchange information about more attractive destinations and form tight communities in the destination countries. While this may have led to a stagnating flow to the Netherlands, other destinations are on the rise.

Brazil is an enormous country without an organised migration network directed towards the Netherlands. Because of this, the 'group' is rather scattered. It is not possible to talk about 'the Brazilians' in the Netherlands. Brazil is a rather large country with different people, habits and practices in different parts of the country. In Brazil, the population is not homogenous, neither is the scattered Brazilian population in the Netherlands. One particular divide among migrants here is the illegal/legal divide. Often people emphasise the differences between these groups, implying that there is a 'stupid' irregular group of Brazilians that only thinks about money (Key informant 2010). Besides that the population is, as it is in Brazil, divided by skin colour. This divide is less strong than the previous mentioned. Also concerning religion we can find lines separating the migrants. Churches (Catholic, Evangelic and Pentecostal) have different members who do not mingle within the community. All these issues make it difficult to talk about Brazilians in the Netherlands in general because there is no average type.

Brazilian migration to the Netherlands is one of the rare cases of migration that is expanding. Because of all the increasingly restrictive immigration policies that have been developed over the last years, migration from most countries has stabilised or declined.

Brazilian migration however, although partly irregular, is still growing rapidly and therefore represents an exceptional phenomenon.

There appear to have been large flows of Egyptian immigrants during the seventies and eighties which have gone down during the nineties and after the turn of the century. However, because the available official data only start in the nineties this decrease remains invisible. Since the nineties, Egyptian immigration seems to have stabilized or even mildly increased, while our informants' accounts indicate that immigration has decreased. Perhaps the fact that Egyptian immigration usually starts off as irregular migration is one of the reasons for these contradictory findings. Irregular migrants may for example have arrived during the eighties but only managed to legalise their status (and consequently end up in immigration statistics) during the nineties. If we follow the accounts of our informants, Egyptian immigration to the Netherlands should be classified as established or declining. Coptic and Muslim immigration from Egypt to the Netherlands seem to form different 'migration systems'. Perhaps Muslim Egyptian immigration can be classified as declining and Coptic Egyptian immigration as established.

The group of Indian immigrants in the Netherlands is very diverse. Firstly, Hindustani migrants from Surinam have come to the Netherlands and settled. This group is very well integrated and this migration flow has come to an end by now. Their connection to India and Indian migrants seems to be of minor importance. Secondly, there is a group of knowledge migrants from India. Their number is high, but they are in the Netherlands only temporarily. They come individually, their stay is arranged by their employer and their contacts seem to be mainly within the expatriate community. It is a relatively large group but they are rather separated from the rest of the 'Indian community'. Lastly, there is another group of Indians, mostly comprised of students and family migrants. Their population, is relatively small but stable. Migration from India to the Netherlands is characterised by large heterogeneity. It is therefore difficult to classify 'the Indian' migration flow. Again, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that we should differentiate between different types of migration. Indian high skilled migration should be classified as starting, and Surinamese and general Indian migration as established.

While migration from most countries keeps growing mildly regardless of the increasing restrictive policies, migration from Morocco has been declining for several years now. In the larger cities in the Netherlands we find a mix of Moroccan migrants from all different regions. In the Netherlands, the Moroccan population is well established and the second generation of Moroccans born in the Netherlands is even larger than the first generation. Furthermore, the Moroccan 'community' is large and very diverse. It is not possible to discuss the Moroccan community in general. Generally speaking, the immigration to the Netherlands is on the decline, but the 'second' generation is still growing.

In the Ukrainian case we did not only lack reliable data on the large irregular population but also on the regular population who had moved to the Netherlands before Ukraine became independent. Nevertheless, by combining different sources we have seen that this is a case of a starting migration flow. Many migration flows from Ukraine to the Netherlands were short during and took place by chance. Current migration flows that can be distinguished are family formation of mainly Ukrainian women with Dutch partners and labour migration of mainly Ukrainian men who do not have a legal work permit. Although there have been Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands from the early twentieth century on, migration can be labelled as starting since there is no well-established migration system of current migration flows yet.

When looking at the results presented in the country case studies it becomes clear that different migration flows are generated by a different combination of different factors. In the Moroccan case state policies to recruit migrant workers stood at the base of migration flows, while in other cases other factors have produced migration flows with different characteristics. Migration flows occur as a result of, without or even despite immigration policies. Moreover, the Moroccan, Egyptian and Indian cases illustrate that there are substantial differences between migrants from specific countries in terms of generation, migration motives, religious background and education. It therefore also indicates that it is crucial not to consider migrants from the same country of origin a homogeneous 'community', but to take this heterogeneity within migration groups into account when doing research or developing policies on immigration and integration.

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